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Executive Summary 
This report discusses the results of IA-HySafe Research Priority Workshop for Hydrogen 
Safety held in Petten, The Netherlands in September 2016. During the workshop the 
participants were asked to identify the state-of-the-art, current research directions and 
gaps that needs addressing to ensure safe deployment of hydrogen technologies in a 
commercial setting. This was done in each of the topical areas highlighted during the 
workshop. These topical areas were:  
1 Industrial programs 
2 Integrated computational tools 
3 Accident Physics – Gas phase 
4 Accident Physics – Liquid phase 
5 Applications 
6 Hydrogen Storage 
7 Materials 
8 General Aspects of Safety 
These topics were a growth from previous workshops. Also new issues needing 
consideration as we continue to deploy hydrogen technologies into the commercial 
environment were introduced. After the workshop the participants and other members of 
IA-HySafe were asked to rank the importance of these topics in the frame of an online 
survey. The following priorities have been derived from the summaries related to the 
topical areas provided by the chairs of those topical areas and from the results of the 
survey. 
The first set of priorities deals with the accident physics and material issues which are 
the indispensable basis for improved risk assessment and management methodologies 
and for safer applications in general.  
With respect to hydrogen in its gaseous phase, premixed combustion is given highest 
priority for further investigation. Modeling of flame acceleration, Deflagration to 
Detonation Transition (DDT) and associated pressure effects for large scale applications 
with obstacles and interaction with mitigation techniques, in particular venting and water 
sprays, need further work. With regard to non-premixed combustion, and with lower 
priority, validation data for radiation properties of large scale fire balls and jet fires 
should be investigated. 
Regarding the liquid hydrogen behaviour a number of knowledge gaps still exist, 
validated models are lacking for all accident phenomena. Validated models for multiphase 
releases (chocked flow/jets) and accumulations in particular in congested areas indoors 
and outdoors have highest priority. Second priority is attributed to pool spreading and 
fires as well as potential for BLEVE and fire resistance of cryo-containers. Although some 
efforts and little progress in the dispersion modelling could be made with few large scale 
experiments performed by HSL, these experiments also generated new open questions in 
particular the multiphase characteristics of the pool fire and spontaneous ignition. 
In general for both, hydrogen in its gaseous and liquid phase, realistic boundary 
conditions (congestion and confinement) as well as the ignition physics are highlighted. 
Setting up and filling a database of fatigue data for the most relevant pressure vessel 
materials have been given highest priority in the Materials topic. Highly correlated is the 
need for better understanding the influence of pressure, purity and temperature on these 
data and to agree on suitable qualification metrics and test strategies. For polymers 
appropriate models for lifetime prediction under realistic conditions, standard test 
protocols and selection criteria have been prioritized on a similar high level. 
With respect to Risk Assessment considerable progress can be achieved with the QRA 
Tool HyRAM. As the QRA Tools topic had been prioritized strongly in the previous 
workshop (Washington 2014) several related activities have been initiated or enforced 
worldwide. However, highest maturity is achieved with the US DOE supported HyRAM 
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tool. For all of these tools frequency data and suitable models for accounting for 
mitigation measures are lacking, representing the highest priorities in this topic. In 
general, validation concepts have to be developed for these tools. Possibly some results 
of the FCH-JU Project SUSANA for the validation of CFD codes for risk assessment could 
be transferred. 
The different applications add special technical aspects to the general physics prioritized 
above. For public supply infrastructure, i.e. hydrogen fueling stations the expected 
scaling up and efficiency requirements of the fueling services implies increasing usage of 
LH2. Therefore most relevant scenarios include LH2 related phenomena (like safe transfer 
of LH2 from trucks to the stations), but also general fire, pressure vessel ruptures and 
explosions of premixed systems including direct and missile effects at the HFS.1 First 
priority is to account for cascading effects, presence or accident initiation with 
conventional fuels (multi-fuel stations) and the complex and partially confined real 
geometries in the applied risk assessment. Appropriate models for mitigation concepts 
should eliminate unnecessary over-conservatisms and avoid raising unjustified safety 
concerns in the public. Obviously, the HFS topic also links to the material issues. In 
particular the welding processes for steels suitable for high pressure, high purity 
application deserve further attention.  
For the hydrogen vehicles in particular accidental scenarios in confined or partially 
confined environment, like tunnel, garages, and repair shops or at fueling stations, have 
been given highest priority. These scenarios include the critical issue of safe strategies 
for first and second responders and concepts for mitigating catastrophic pressure vessel 
ruptures. With the onboard storage representing the most critical component of a 
hydrogen vehicle this topic is highly correlated with general safety topics of hydrogen 
storage. There improved protection against fire or thermal excursions has highest 
priority. This ranking is supported by the required upgrade of the GTR n°13 where 
definition of more realistic car fires (heat flux measurements and testing) is required to 
standardize the corresponding testing appropriately. Structural health monitoring has 
2nd priority in the Storage topic. Also, closely related to the Materials issues, the 
modeling of ageing and thermal degradation with a special focus on liner stability and 
permeability has 3rd priority. 
Most of the open issues of the Power-to-Hydrogen (P2H) application are material related. 
Compared to the other applications, this application has matured considerably. Safety 
relevant parameters of hydrogen/natural gas blends have been evaluated or are just on 
the way to be published. However, support for international harmonized standardization 
is required for transnational solutions and for demonstration of a harmonized common 
knowledge. To this end collection of field data is considered the most important action. 
Although not treated explicitly in the workshop and questionnaire, high temperature and 
pressure electrolysis will involve new safety issues, which should be addressed 
appropriately. 
Hydrogen aerospace and aviation applications are mainly applying LH2 for gravitational 
performance reasons. Therefore these applications refer to the same gaps in the basic 
understanding and in the modeling capabilities as introduced above for the general LH2 
related accident physics. 
Hydrogen sensors are currently and successfully being deployed to assure safety. 
Nevertheless, there are still critical gaps with regard to sensor technology. Most urgently 
needed is appropriate guidance on selection and placement of sensors for the different 
applications. 
Besides mitigation concepts risk management is addressed by appropriate education and 
training.  First responders training for tunnel and garage scenarios and guidance for 
second responders dealing with pre-damaged high pressure equipment have been 
highlighted. However, providing specially tailored state-of-the-art educational and 
                                          
1 Note: Explosion used in this report refers to any combustion process that results in significant overpressure. 
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training material for all involved stakeholders is a continuous task, which supports 
adequate risk perception and acceptance of hydrogen technology and helps achieving an 
excellent safety culture. 
 5 
1 Introduction 
The Research Priority Workshop on Hydrogen Safety is organized every even year, Petten 
in September 2016 following the workshops held in Washington (2014), Berlin (2012), 
and Petten (2009). The International Association for Hydrogen Safety IA-HySafe 
organizes this meeting in the framework of its Research Committee activities in 
cooperation with the Joint Research Center (JRC) and the US Department of Energy 
(DOE). 
The main focus of the workshop is to identify and prioritize existing knowledge gaps. The 
gaps were addressed from the standpoint of scientific knowledge - including 
experimental, theoretical and numerical capabilities - and collected the opinions of 
industry.  
The outcome of this exercise is intended to help coordinate research, guide research 
directions and supply funding agencies with a list of prioritized work topics. Building on 
the foundations of previous workshops, it aims at providing an incremental update on the 
state-of-the-art and knowledge gaps. This process avoids re-addressing already filled 
gaps, and helps to demonstrate progress. The workshop aims also at preparing and 
introducing the relevant topics of the International Conference on Hydrogen Safety which 
is organized every odd year. The output of this workshop was presented at the ICHS2017 
in September 2017.  
For preparing the workshop a panel of experts and chairs was selected by the organizers. 
The selected participants covered their respective areas of competence and their 
contributions were put together by the different chairs. 
During the workshop, the chair of each topical session provided an executive summary, 
aggregating and coordinating the contributions of the relevant experts. Each panelist, 
through their contribution, was invited to answer the following questions:  
1. What has been done in the last three to four years (progress)? 
2. What is planned for near term research direction (working topics)? 
3. What are the needs / gaps that need to be filled by future research (new directions)? 
The respective presentations of the chairs are accessible from the IA-HySafe 
website2.The current report collects the chairs’ contributions, which in turn reflect the 
contributions of the participants. The chairs played a key role in summarizing and 
harmonizing the contributions and the comments from participants and other experts 
received before and during the workshop. In the following, the contributions from the 
chairs are presented according to the sessions order held during the workshop.  
This report is the main product of the Research Priority Workshop and follows earlier 
reports3 produced after previous workshops. 
Annex I collects the results of a prioritization exercise carried out after the workshop. 
Experts were asked to rank topics related to hydrogen safety. The outcome of an on-line 
survey on topics prioritization is presented in the Annex. 
                                          
2 https://www.hysafe.info/activities/research-priorities-workshops/rpw2016-agenda-and-presentations/ 
(Registration might be required). 
3 Berlin (2012) https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/5acc2c57-56b9-40f1-8dd5-
9f097bbc1584 
Washington (2014) https://www.hysafe.info/activities/research-priorities-workshops/research-priorities-
workshop-2014-washington/ 
Petten (2009) http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC58011 
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2 Industrial4 Programs  
Chair: M. Steen (EC-JRC) - Participants and contributors: Mirela Atanasiu (FCH2-JU), 
Tetsufumi Ikeda (HySUT), Nha Nguyen (DOT), Chris San Marchi (SNL) 
2.1 HySUT - Japan Introduction and Stage Setting 
Tetsufumi Ikeda gave an overview of the HySUT (The Association of Hydrogen Supply 
and Utilization Technology-Japan) activities and goals. In particular, the new HySUT 
roadmap targets for Fuel Cell Vehicles (FCV) and Hydrogen Fueling Stations (HFS) were 
given: 40,000 units by 2020, growing to 800,000 by 2030 for FCVs, and 160 HFSs by 
2020 in the major metropolitan areas, with the addition of another 100 small scale HFSs, 
also by 2020. 
Ongoing activities on hydrogen quality control in HFS, hydrogen fueling protocols and 
hydrogen metering technologies with the aim of developing JISs (Japan Industrial 
Standard), were presented. 
The development of a Reliability Database containing not only negative (accidents and 
incidents), but also positive occurrences such as successful operation time, was 
presented.  
2.2 H2FIRST – U.S.A. 
Chris San Marchi gave an overview on US activities. The special focus on development 
and validation of fueling protocols was covered. It was mentioned that in the US, 
currently it is responsibility of the OEMs to assess HFS' compliance against their 
requirements. Reference components in a HFS are monitored by H2FIRST, but the focus 
is mainly on costs rather than safety. It was mentioned that due to reluctance from 
industry to finance HFSs deployment, the state of California established funding 
programs to deploy the first 100 stations. The situation for HFSs in the North-East is 
different, since financial contribution from industry is playing a key role there.  However, 
government funding from the states will still be required to deploy HFS in sufficient 
numbers to enable successful deployment of FCEV’s.  
2.3 FCH2-JU – Europe 
Mirela Atanasiu gave an overview on the structure of FCH2-JU, its role within the 
European Energy Union strategy, its budget and its activities. This was followed by a 
summary on projects related to hydrogen safety financed by the Joint Undertaking. 
2.4 GTR n°13 – International 
Nha Nguyen presented the activities of UNECE's Global Technical Regulation No.13 
(Hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles). The working group consists of governmental 
participants from China, European Union, Korea, Canada, United States and India, 
industry participants from standards developing organizations, automobile and 
component manufacturers. Contracting Parties are obligated to start an adoption process 
of GTR No.13 into their national regulations. The three main FCEV's parts considered by 
GTR 13 are: 
-The high pressure fuel container system 
-Fuel system at vehicle level: in-use and post-crash hydrogen leakage limits  
-Electrical integrity of high voltage system: in-use and post-crash 
                                          
4 Remark: In fact the title of this session  misleading; initially it was planned that industry partners present their programs. In the further 
planning of the workshop it became obvious that rather publicly funded programs and international overarching activities should be 
highlighted in the beginning of the workshop. The actual activities of the industry are included in the technical sessions. 
 7 
Some tests and the requirements for each group were presented.  
Currently GTR 13 has been adopted by EU (transposed GTR into UN-ECE), Japan and 
Korea. The US is currently preparing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), which is 
expected in 2017. A 'phase 2' for GTR is expected to start soon and should touch 
material compatibility, stress rupture, electric safety, improved test procedures and the 
potential scope for revision to include other vehicle classes. 
2.5 Gaps and Next Steps  
In further discussions high priority was given to upgrading the GTR n°13 with regard to  
 Realistic car fires (heat flux measurements and testing) 
 Update of existing requirements and test procedures in GTR 13 
 Mechanical performance of polymer liners and effect of high and low temperature 
excursions (softening temperature, ductile properties and permeability loss). 
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3 Integrated Computational Tools  
Chair: Andrei V. Tchouvelev (AVT) - Participants and contributors: Katrina Groth (SNL), 
Dmitriy Makarov (UU), Frank Markert (DTU) and Thomas Jordan (KIT)  
3.1 Introduction and Stage Setting 
Topical research areas directly relevant to Integrated Computational Tools were highly 
ranked at the Research Priorities Workshop (RPW) in 2014 shown in Table 3.1. 
Table. 3.1: Ranking of research areas from the RPW2014 report 
 
Within the Topic “Tools and resources for QRA” the user-friendly industry-focused tools 
received the highest ranking as well as shown in Table 3.2 below. 
Table 3.2: Ranking within “QRA Tools” from the RPW2014 report. 
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As shown in Table 3.1, reduced model tools were recognized as a significant need to 
address a technical gap in hydrogen safety R&D activities worldwide (15%). This 
represents a direct link to the QRA Tools, wherein such tools will be implemented. Sub-
ranking with the reduced model tools is shown on Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Ranking within “Reduced Model Tools” from the RPW2014 report. 
 
To better understand the context and purpose of Integrated Computational Tools, the 
following definition has been proposed. 
Integrated Computational Tools for hydrogen safety – a suite of engineering 
probabilistic and / or physical effects (consequence) validated models integrated into a 
user-friendly interface allowing the user to input user-specific information and boundary 
conditions and capable of generating risk and / or hazard assessment data within 
reasonably short time (seconds to minutes). 
The words "integrated" and “engineering” are key and is highlighted to differentiate these 
tools from more sophisticated ones such as Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) that 
normally requires hours to days to get a result on a specific hazard scenario. 
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3.2 Risk Assessment Tools  
3.2.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment Tools 
This topic was presented by Dr. Katrina Groth from Sandia National Labs, USA, who leads 
this international effort within IEA HIA Task 37. Figure 3.1 below illustrates how 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) has been enabling hydrogen infrastructure 
deployment with US within the past 12 years.  
 
Fig. 3.1: Sandia QRA activities since 2005. 
In 2014 Sandia developed the HyRAM (Hydrogen Risk Assessment Models) tool [1-3], 
which fits perfectly the above definition of an integrated computational tool. HyRAM is a 
comprehensive methodology and accompanying software toolkit for assessing the safety 
of hydrogen fueling and storage infrastructure via Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). 
HyRam incorporates integrated consequence analysis (discussed in this section) and/or 
stand-alone use of deterministic consequence models (discussed further in section 4.3). 
The HyRAM software toolkit provides a consistent, documented methodology for QRA 
with validated integrated reduced-order physical models for use in hydrogen systems. 
HyRAM also contains probabilistic data and models that have been vetted by the 
international hydrogen research community. HyRAM is intended to facilitate evidence-
based decision-making to support codes and standards development and performance 
based compliance. 
HyRAM is a model integration platform for comprehensive QRA, providing a unified 
language and architecture for models and data relevant to hydrogen safety. The 
development of a unified software framework also facilitates completeness and usability: 
experts from across the international hydrogen safety research community can contribute 
validated models from their domain of expertise, and the hydrogen industry benefits 
from a “one-stop-shop” for those models. 
HyRAM core functionality includes: 
● Documented Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) methodology  
● Generic data for gaseous hydrogen (GH2) systems: component leak frequencies, 
ignition probability; modifiable by users 
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● Fast-running, experimentally validated models of gaseous hydrogen physical 
effects for consequence modeling  
● Release characteristics (plumes, accumulation) 
● Flame properties (jet fires, deflagration within enclosures) 
● Probabilistic models for human harm from thermal and overpressure hazards 
HyRAM key features are: 
● GUI and Mathematics Middleware 
● Documented approach, models, algorithms 
● Fast running on a personal computer: to accommodate rapid iteration 
● Flexible and expandable framework; supported by active R&D 
The HyRAM QRA methodology follows the general QRA approach. The HyRAM toolkit 
contains two user-interfaces – one that allows stand-alone implementation of the 
physical effects (deterministic) models for flames and overpressures and one for a QRA 
with those models. In general the QRA approach uses a combination of probabilistic and 
deterministic models to evaluate the risk for a given system. The methodology uses 
traditional QRA probabilistic model approaches to assess the likelihood of various 
hydrogen release and ignition scenarios, which can lead to thermal and overpressure 
hazards. Several deterministic models are used together to characterize the physical 
effects for the scenarios. Information from the physical effect models is passed into 
probit functions that calculate consequences in terms of number of fatalities. 
A significant value of HyRAM is that it supports calculation of the following key fatality 
risk metrics (Expected value) as shown on Figure 3.2 below: 
● FAR (Fatal Accident Rate) – number of fatalities per 100 million exposed hours 
● AIR (Average Individual Risk) – number of fatalities per exposed individual 
● PLL (Potential Loss of Life) – number of fatalities per system-year  
It also can calculate the following accident scenario metrics (Expected value): 
● Number of hydrogen releases per system-year (unignited and ignited cases) 
● Number of jet fires per system-year (immediate ignition cases) 
● Number of deflagrations/explosions per system-year (delayed ignition cases) 
 
Fig. 3.2: Screenshot of HyRAM QRA Mode  
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In summary, HyRAM provides a platform, which integrates state-of-the-art; validated 
science and engineering models and data relevant to hydrogen safety into a 
comprehensive, industry-focused decision support system. The use of a standard 
platform for conducting hydrogen QRA ensures that various industry stakeholders can 
produce metrics for safety from defensible, traceable calculations. The physical models 
underlying the HyRAM platform have been experimentally validated with hydrogen in the 
parameter (e.g., pressure, temperature) range of interest for hydrogen systems. The 
probability data included in HyRAM have been developed by reference to systems using 
hydrogen as much as possible. The software architecture of HyRAM is modular, with the 
anticipated addition and revision of modules and data as the state-of-the-art advances. 
3.2.1.1 Remaining Challenges and Barriers 
● On-going need for safety data and models:  
o Validated consequence models for hydrogen behaviours, including: 
liquid/cryogenic release behaviour; deflagration (unconfined) and 
detonation models; transition from deflagration to detonation (DDT); 
flow/flame surface interactions, barrier walls, and ignition. Note: This gap 
also relates to the HyRAM consequence models. 
o Operating experience or other information to generate data/probabilities 
for hydrogen system component failures, leak frequencies, detection 
effectiveness, etc. 
● Need for additional features and models to enable deeper system-specific insights 
to enable overcoming station-siting barriers 
o Uncertainty & sensitivity analysis capabilities 
o Higher fidelity and depth of QRA models (e.g., Fault Trees, Event Sequence 
Diagrams, importance measures) - Capabilities to allow users to develop 
scenarios, root cause models, etc. 
● Opportunities to partner to support formal software activities, validation, testing, 
training, design decision making…. 
Long-term vision: 
● Partner with stakeholders to create a fully configurable, tested software product 
available for users to calculate hydrogen risk values and consequences;  
● Able to support a wide range of activities within safety, codes, and standards.  
3.2.2 Risk Assessment via Dynamic Modeling 
This topic was presented by Dr. Frank Markert from Denmark Technical University (DTU), 
who leads the subtask on human reliability analysis within IEA HIA Task 37. 
Application of dynamic and dependent models as an alternative to QRA is based on the 
following approach: 
● The event sequences trigger each other and are simulated concurrently 
● Events taking place in one sequence change the conditions in the other sequences 
(dynamic interaction) 
This approach is graphically presented on Figure 3.3 below: 
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Fig. 3.3: Application of dynamic and dependent models. 
The key motivation for alternative to QRA tools is related to limitations of conventional 
models. 
Conventional systems analysis tools such as fault & event trees, Bayesian networks, 
cause-consequence and barrier diagrams have proven to be very effective tools for 
reliability and risks analyses. However, they cannot capture a number of features 
accurately: 
  e.g. difficult to be applied to dynamic situations with: 
o  dynamic demand: seasonal - daily changes  
o  loss of partial performance  
o  gas supply variations (amount gas delivered) 
o  down times 
o  residual time of gas delivery e.g. from line pack storage 
o  gradual recovery after a failure 
It is very well known that traditional QRA may result in significant uncertainty due to its 
reliance on accuracy of information and validity of assumptions. Starting from operational 
data, failure scenarios selection, modelling physical phenomena to probabilistic 
assessment based on available statistics – uncertainty increases every step of the way. 
For example, hydrogen ignition probability alone may differ by one to three orders of 
magnitude in various recorded QRA studies. Those are presumed to be discrete values 
within a wide range of operating parameters. 
To the contrary, Discrete Even Simulations (DES) model continuous and dynamic 
characteristics and addresses multidimensionality of systems. Traditionally DES are 
employed to model e.g. manufacturing plants with machines, people, transport devices, 
conveyor belts and storage spaces in order to optimize manufacturing processes. 
Different ready-to-use commercial software packages are available on the market. DES 
opens new perspectives for reliability modeling that combines discrete and continuous 
technological and procedural aspects, e.g. it also includes human reliability. 
Application field of DES models includes the following: 
● Such models may provide more detailed answers to questions that depend on 
varying parameters  
● The model retains geographical dependencies and time patterns  
Physical 
phenomena 
Detection & 
response 
Escape & 
evacuation Impact & 
consequence 
Tim e 
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● The model may predict extremely rare events that may occur during the life time 
of an (pipeline) installation -> run time may cover millions of years.  
● Possibility to include human operations as maintenance or any other task.  
● Models can be extended to mimic the work flow on fueling stations incl. the 
varying fuel demand by customers. 
DES modeling allows establishing interdependencies between various event trees, which 
helps achieving more accurate risk estimation. 
An example of such established interdependencies is shown on Figure 3.4 below 
illustrating the escalation of a hazardous material release resulting in fatalities. 5 
Fig. 3.4: Example of established interdependencies in DES model.  
In summary, these are key features of DES modeling: 
● Both processes and events are modelled 
● Models are dynamic (vs. static conventional models) 
● Data are sampled statistically, e.g. hole size, wind speed 
● Easy housekeeping of models and results  
o transparency of calculations 
● Animation and graphical scenarios contribute to understanding and confidence 
● Domain experts understand models and influence their development 
● Easy integration of the technical part and human performance 
● Multiple runs are performed to extract risk numbers for assessing Individual Risk, 
Potential Loss of Life, Group Risk). 
3.3 Consequence Modelling Tools 
Consequence modeling tools were presented by Drs. Thomas Jordan (KIT), Katrina Groth 
(Sandia), Dmitri Makarov (UU) and Andrei V. Tchouvelev (AVT).  
Consequence modeling tools were partially addressed via research area “Integration 
Platforms” that was ranked 7th as shown on Table 3.1.  
Within ”Integration Platforms” the following ranking of sub-topics was derived. 
                                          
5 Note: explosion used here describes a combustion event that results in significant overpressure. 
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Table 3.4: Expert ranking within Integration Platforms from 2014 RPW report. 
 
It should be noted here that Consequence modeling tools are split between engineering 
tools and CFD. 
3.3.1 Progress Summary 
(Available) Engineering Tools: 
 H2FC Cyberlab SAGE Network (provides some first models) 
 NETTOOLS (project application under FCH2-JU was successful and plans to 
continue H2FC Cyberlab development).  
 HyRAM consequence models (“Physics mode”) 
 University of Ulster suite of engineering models and 
 Canadian toolkit (UQTR and AVT)    
CFD Tools: 
 SUSANA FCH-JU project SUSANA provided the basis for CFD validation 
 FireFOAM user basis is growing 
 GexCon has been working on an integrated approach for FLACS 
 
3.3.2 Status and Important Findings 
3.3.2.1 SAGE-based Network 
SAGE based service got stuck after H2FC project stopped. Server was attacked, resulting 
on unstable service. Lack of modularity: referencing one notebook from another did not 
work smoothly. 
3.3.2.2 NETTOOLS 
Work package will translate the PmWiki based BRHS/ Hydrogen Safety Handbook to 
Jupyter notebooks (see jupyter.org) to be used as a more open framework for the 
scientific community and as an academic educational tool. 
3.3.2.3 HyRAM Consequence Models 
Hydrogen behaviour studies are at the foundation of HyRAM’s consequence modeling 
capabilities. The achieved progress since 2005 is graphically presented on Figure 3.5 
below. 
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Fig. 3.5: Sandia progress in hydrogen behaviour development since 2005. 
Within HyRAM, the following documented and validated models can be used from a 
simple user-interface in an engineering toolkit, or in physics (consequence) mode: 
● Temperature-pressure-density calculations using the Abel-Nobel equation of state 
● Tank mass flow-rate and blowdown, based on initial pressure and orifice size 
● Under-expanded CGH2 jet dispersion, with graphical representation of mean 
concentration boundaries 
● Accumulation and layering in an enclosure, with layer height, flammable mass, 
and overpressure generated upon deflagration 
● CGH2 flame temperature profile 
● CGH2 flame radiation, with graphical representation of iso-heat flux contours 
3.3.2.4 University of Ulster (UU) Suite of Engineering Models 
Below is the list developed and validated engineering models by UU: 
 Under-expanded CGH2 jet parameters (in real and notional nozzles) [4, 5] 
 The similarity law for CGH2 concentration decay and hazard distances in 
axisymmetric expanded and under-expanded jets [6, 4]  
 Tank blowdown dynamics as a function of volume, pressure, and leak diameter: 
adiabatic and isothermal releases [7, 4]  
 Pressure peaking phenomenon for unignited release for: constant mass flow rate 
release and tank blowdown [8, 4]  
 Flame length and three hazard distances (no-harm, injury, fatality) for jet fires 
[9] 
 Passive ventilation in an enclosure with one vent [10, 11] 
 Blast wave decay from high-pressure GH2 tank storage [12] 
 Vent sizing correlation for deflagration mitigations [13] 
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 Nomogram for effect of buoyancy on hazard distances[14, 15, 4]  
UU has also been developing CFD tools for safety engineering. Their vision for open 
source CFD code is the following: 
 License-free CFD code “HyFOAM” for academic research and industrial safety 
engineering design (financial support is required) based on OpenFOAM 
 Legacy of EC FP7 H2FC project 
 Collection of case studies, demos and tutorials: 
o Releases 
o Fires 
o Deflagrations 
o Detonations 
o etc. 
 Current progress: 
o CGH2 axisymmetric jet 
o Deflagration in open atmosphere 
 
3.3.2.5 Canadian Toolkit (UQTR / AVT) 
The partnership of UQTR and AVT developed a toolkit that includes a number of published 
and validated engineering models to predict hydrogen and methane dispersion, 
overpressure and thermal effects [16]. The strongest feature the tool kit includes is a 
prediction of the effect of either hydrogen and methane jet proximity to surface (both 
horizontal and vertical). A graphical sample of the Canadian toolkit screenshot showing 
the effect of the surface vs other models that do not take into account the surface effect 
is shown on Figure 3.6 below. 
 
Fig. 3.6: Screenshot from Canadian toolkit illustrating the effect of surface on the extent of 
hydrogen jet. 
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3.4 Gaps and Next Steps 
3.4.1 QRA Tools: HyRAM 2.0 ++ 
● Scoping algorithms for uncertainty analysis and dynamic QRA  
● Incorporate software changes to assimilate IRIS software to allow users to edit 
Event Trees, Fault Trees & calculate importance measures  
● Establishing process to enable external R&D community to contribute models and 
data, i.e. as plug-ins 
3.4.2 Consequence Modeling Tools 
● Defining the validation basis in particular for engineering tools to be used for HFS 
and other H2 applications. 
● Develop sound course material for HyRAM and offer courses to the community 
(potential activity of the IA-HySafe educational committee, provided agreement 
by SNL) 
● Introducing Uncertainty Quantification UQ for the CFD in the consequence analysis 
tools (although these type of uncertainties are small compared to the 
uncertainties in the statistical basis for QRA in general). There are new methods 
for UQ in CFD applied in particular for nuclear safety assessments 
3.4.2.1 Engineering Tools To Be Developed 
Models available: 
● Forced ventilation system parameters 
● Upper limit of hydrogen inventory in closed space [17] 
● Mitigation of localised non-uniform deflagration by venting 
● Blowdown time as a function of storage pressure, volume and TPRD diameter 
Models not yet available: 
● Pressure peaking phenomenon for ignited releases 
● Radiation from hydrogen fireball after high-pressure CGH2 tank rapture in a fire 
● Effect of buoyancy on jet fire hazard distances 
It is also critical to develop and validate engineering models for high pressure hydrogen 
in enclosures. Available validated enclosure models are not relevant to realistic conditions 
of high pressure hydrogen systems. 
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4 Accident Physics – Gas phase  
Chair: Jay Keller (ZCES, DOE) - Participants and contributors: Katrina Groth (SNL), Ethan 
Hecht (SNL), Dmitriy Makarov (UU), Chris San Marchi (SNL) and Trygve Skjold (Gexcon) 
4.1 Introduction 
This section addresses issues involving gas phase unintended releases; topics include 
Venting, Pressure Peaking, Blast Waves, Jet Fires, and reduced order modeling for use in 
integrated software tools. Understanding unintended gas phase releases under realistic 
scenarios has been central to ensuring the safe deployment of hydrogen technologies. As 
will be described below, we have made great progress in understanding this behaviour 
and hence, have been able to design systems to safely deploy hydrogen technologies.  
This topic was ranked 5th @ 8% between the topics at the 2014 RPW. Ranking within this 
topic is shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Expert ranking within Unintended Gas Release topic from 2014 RPW report. 
 
4.2 Progress – State of the Art 
4.2.1 Venting 
The work of Molkov et.al. at the University of Ulster (UU) have developed impressive set 
of predictive models of venting scenarios [11]. These models do a good job at calculating 
the ventilation geometry needed for appropriate ventilation requirements. Including a 
variable neutral plane does a good job of predicting the flow for lighter than air gasses, 
this allows for analysis of concentration gradients in the enclosure. Predicting vented 
overpressures is a bit of a challenge.  The EU Fuel Cell Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCH-
JU) is funding a project “HyIndoor” to investigate this exact problem. 
4.2.2 Pressure Peaking 
Pressure peaking is a phenomenon that occurs if a tank releases its high pressure 
contents of light gases, which subsequently expand at a rate faster than venting can 
occur. This phenomenon is particularly acute with high pressure hydrogen. Molkov’s 
group at UU has been studying this for several years and has developed very impressive 
validated models that can predict this behaviour well [11, 8]. 
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Fig. 4.1: Pressure peaking (calculation represents a 350 bar storage system, non-reacting release 
thru a 5.08 mm orifice, mass flow rate of 390 g/s)[18] 
4.2.3 Blast Waves 
The notion of a catastrophic tank failure is of concern to some AHJ’s around the globe. 
The consequence of such an event is directly linked to the scenario under consideration. 
The tank release (with or without combustion) soon after a catastrophic tank failure has 
been studied by Molkov et.al. [18, 12]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2: Comparison of blast waves; simulation vs. experiment 
4.2.4 Non-Premixed Combustion (Jet flames) 
Non-Premixed combustion on a fundamental level has an excellent scientific basis. 
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has been organizing the turbulent non-premixed 
flame workshop for decades. These workshops provide a vehicle for modelers to compare 
and validate models against state-of-the-art experiments from around the globe.  The 
turbulent combustion facility at SNL is such an example [19], it has capability to perform: 
 High resolution Lab scale measurements of: 
o Temperature 
o Species (unignited reactants, major products, radicles, pollutants) 
o Velocity 
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 Variations in: 
o Orifice diameter 
o Flow rate / backpressure 
o Aspect ratio 
 Example diagnostics are: 
o Rayleigh 
o Raman 
o Particle imaging velocimetry (PIV) 
o Laser induced fluorescence (LIF) 
o Visual and IR Imaging 
 
Fig. 4.3: SNL non-premixed flame measurements and experiments (from [19]) 
Hazard characteristics from flames have also been well characterized [20]; 
 
Fig. 4.4: Experimental results for flame length and radiant fraction (from [20]) 
Figure 4.4 on the left shows flame length and on the right a calculated radiant fraction 
used to calculate radiative heat flux. 
 Quantified hazards include: 
o Temperature  
o Radiative heat flux 
 Lab scale and field measurements: 
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o Length 
o Width 
o Temperature 
o Heat Flux 
 Reduced correlations for  
o Flame dimensions 
o Radiant fraction (to calculate heat flux) 
 
Fig. 4.5: Reduced order model of jet flame with buoyancy to capture the radiative flux (from [21]). 
 
Fig. 4.6: Reduced order model of jet flame; output from HyRAM [1] showing heat flux contours 
These reduced order models are designed to be used in fast running integrated model 
packages like HyRAM [21], where multiple scenarios can be rapidly simulated using a PC. 
The use of notional nozzle is getting much better, the model developed by Molkov et. al. 
is able to predict the jet behaviour as shown in Figure 4.7. 
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Fig. 4.7: Reduced order model of jet flame; output from HyRAM showing heat flux contours (from 
[21]). 
4.2.5 Ignition  
4.2.5.1 Forced Ignition 
Forced ignition of a non-premixed jet is reasonably well understood. The ensuing jet is 
full of complex turbulent features, as the jet mixes with the ambient air features will be 
characterized by a wide range of mixtures from pure hydrogen to pure air. Due to the 
low minimum ignition energy of hydrogen (0.02mJ), should an ignition source (spark) 
make contact with hydrogen above 4% mole fraction, it will ignite, forming a kernel of 
combusted gas (H2O).  However, there may not be a contiguous propagation route of 
flammable hydrogen (see Fig. 4.8, central frame), or the flame speed may be lower than 
the convective velocity of the jet.  If the flame speed is not fast enough for the flame to 
propagate up stream, the flame is said to “blow off”, and a jet flame will not form.  
However, should the ignition point be within the lightup boundary, then the combustion 
is robust enough to propagate centrally and upstream and form a stable flame. This is 
captured statistically by the flammability factor, which is the average of the probability of 
a concentration being between the lower and upper flammability limits for hydrogen (Fig. 
4.8, right frame) [22]. 
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Fig. 4.8. Shown are unignited mole fractions of hydrogen, measured using planar laser Rayleigh 
scattering. On the left is a time averaged image, and middle is an instantaneous image showing 
the rich turbulent features of this flow. The graph on the right shows contours of the mean mole 
fractions along with the experimentally measured (symbols) and calculated using the flammability 
factor (solid black line) light up boundary (from [22]).  
4.2.5.2 Spontaneous Ignition 
Spontaneous ignition of hydrogen air mixtures is not at all well understood. 81 ignitions 
of H2 releases have been reported in the Major Hazardous Incident Data Service 
(MHIDAS) database. The ignition source was identified in 11 cases (flame, electric, hot 
surface …), while in the remaining 70, no ignition source was identified. 
 The following have been proposed explanations for the observed ignition 
o Joule-Thomson heating (ruled out a 100 MPa release only increase the 
temperature by 53K not enough to reach the auto ignition temperature of 
~858K) 
o Electrostatic discharge (discharge from charged particles) 
o Diffusion ignition (transient high-temperature shock waves) 
o Adiabatic compression (difficult to differentiate from diffusion ignition) 
o Contact with a hot surface 
o Catalytic reaction with materials present in the flow (iron oxide) 
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Fig. 4.9:  On the left is an example of spontaneous ignition exiting a shock tube [23], ignition 
occurred 100% of the time – shock heating  On the right is a delayed spontaneous ignition from a 
chocked flow exit the ignition point is in subsonic flow ignition occurred 100% of the time (shock 
heating is not the source) [24]. 
 
Fig. 4.10: Image of iron oxide static charge experiments at SRI field laboratory Livermore 
California.  Across a wide range of experiments no ignition was observed. 
4.3 Working Topics – Further Work 
4.3.1 Releases and Jet Fires 
 Transient solution for jet flame lift-off and blow-off 
 Delayed ignition (advance the work of Houf et.al. [25]) 
 Effects of barriers on hazard distances 
4.3.2 Blast Waves and fire balls 
 Simulations accounting for real gas properties 
 Thermal radiation effects on blast wave properties 
4.3.3 Deflagrations and detonations 
 Non-uniform vented deflagrations (model validation) 
 DDT simulations 
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4.3.4 Non-Premixed  
 Under expanded jet needs further work 
 Need a “correct” equation of state 
4.3.5 Ignition 
4.3.5.1 Forced 
 Lightup boundary can be predicted by using the Flammability Factor (FF), but we 
need to improve our modeling of the FF 
4.3.5.2 Spontaneous 
 We simply do not understand spontaneous ignition. 
4.3.6 Premixed Combustion – large scale 
 We need reliable engineering tools for consequence analysis 
o enclosures with obstructions 
o Open environments with obstructions 
o DDT modeling / prediction 
4.4 Gaps and Next Steps 
 Pressure Peaking phenomena 
o Model for ignited jet flames 
o Thermal loads to inside structures 
 Passive ventilation 
o Model for multiple vents 
o Improved modeling of wind effects 
 Blast waves 
o Wider Validation of modeling 
o Include broader scope of scenarios 
 Deflagrations / detonations 
o Wider validation of modeling tools 
o DDT modeling and predictions 
o Engineering models for flame acceleration around obstacles  
 Ignition – forced 
o Forced 
 Reduced order model for accurate prediction of flammable extent 
(FF) 
 Influence of hardware in the flow (igniter vs laser spark) 
o Spontaneous 
 Fundamental Mechanisms 
 Prediction 
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4.5 Summary 
The fundamental science basis for non-premixed flames is very good. The hazards from 
these flames are also well characterized. Reduced order models have been developed 
and work reasonably well to predict thermal load consequences and are being used in 
integrated platforms (HyRAM). Therefore the sub-topic of Non-Premixed Jet Flames is 
given a low priority for further investigation. 
On the other hand it has been given a high priority to the sub-topic of Premixed 
Combustion for further investigation. The phenomena is well understood from a 
fundamental perspective but modeling for large scale applications with obstacles needs 
further work – particularly the understanding and modeling of DDT. 
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5 Accident Physics – Liquid/cryogenic behaviour  
Chair: Phil Hooker (HSL) - Participants and contributors: Ethan Hecht (SNL), Jennifer 
Wen (UW) and Simon Jallais (Air Liquide) 
5.1 Introduction 
Liquid Hydrogen LH2 has clearly been used in a number of industries for many years, 
having first been liquefied in the late 1800 by James Dewar. In addition to its best known 
use as rocket fuel (the Saturn V rocket utilising 1.2 Million liters of LH2 for each of the 
Apollo missions) it is widely used in the electronics and other industries. In future 
however, it is clear that it can be used as a bulk fuel for a range of relatively energy 
intensive applications in the transport sector, which will require larger quantities of fuel 
to be stored on board, such as ships, trains etc.    
From a hazards management point of view, the complexities and extreme conditions 
implied with liquid hydrogen handling put different demands on safety assessments and 
the modelling of accidental release, mixing and combustion. The quality and level of 
detail of experimental data available in literature are insufficient to allow complete and 
accurate validation of CFD. Unfortunately, criteria for model performance in other field 
(e.g. LNG) cannot be easily adapted. They need to be revised for LH2 because of the 
significant differences in its physical properties. 
5.1.1 Properties of LH2 and cryogenic hydrogen causing difficulties 
There are a number of properties that distinguish the behaviour of LH2 and cryogenic 
hydrogen from that of other cryogenic materials such as liquefied natural gas (LNG). 
Table 5.1 summarizes some key features, including the boiling and melting points, of 
hydrogen, methane, and major components of air. 
As the table shows the boiling temperature of hydrogen is lower than the one of the main 
constituents of air, nitrogen and oxygen, and of methane. This low, cryogenic 
temperature implies that the production of LH2 is quite energy intensive. Furthermore it 
makes handling of LH2 quite complicated and direct contact of LH2 or its very cold 
containers will generate new hazards to the ambient and human beings. 
Table 5.1 Key thermodynamic properties of hydrogen, methane and main air components. 
 Hydrogen Nitrogen Oxygen Methane 
Liquid density (kg/m3) 70 807 1141 717 
Gas density at boiling point (kg/m3) 1.3 4.6 4.5 1.8 
Boiling point (K) 20.28 77.36 90.19 111.6 
Freezing point (K) 14.01 63.15 50.5 90.7 
For example, the extremely low boiling point of hydrogen means that spills and releases 
cannot only cause condensation and icing of the atmospheric moisture but also of the 
components of air itself. These associated phase changes cause complications in 
understanding how such releases can be modelled. As shown by HSL experiments [26], 
the low temperature of spills of LH2 freezes out nitrogen and, more importantly, oxygen 
from the air. Liquid Oxygen LOX in itself represents a serious hazard, in particular when 
in contact with flammable substances like LH2. The formation of condensed phase 
mixtures of LH2 and solid / liquid air (Figure 5.1) has been observed to give rise to 
explosive behaviour even when the cloud of hydrogen gas is small, possibly due to 
oxygen enrichment in the condensed phase. 
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Figure 5.1 Solidified air formed during LH2 release along the ground (from [26]). 
5.1.2 Potential future applications 
As already discussed, for scaling up the hydrogen supply infrastructure the transport of 
LH2 is the most effective option due to its energy density. For the transport sector 
especially, with the planned large bus fleets, the emerging hydrogen fueled train, boat 
and truck projects and even for the pre-cooled 70 MPa car fueling, LH2 offers higher 
energy densities, gains in efficiency and in some instances even a risk reduction when 
compared to a large scale compressed hydrogen supply infrastructure. 
LH2 implies specific hazards and risks, which are very different from those associated 
with the relatively well-known compressed gaseous hydrogen. Although these specific 
issues are usually well reflected and managed in large-scale industry and aerospace 
applications of LH2, experience with LH2 in a distributed energy system is lacking. 
Transport and storage of LH2 in urban areas and the daily use by the untrained general 
public will require higher levels of safety provisions accounting for its specific properties. 
The quite different operational conditions compared with the industrial environment and 
therefore also different potential accident scenarios will put an emphasis on specific 
related phenomena which are still not well understood. Specific recommendations and 
harmonized performance based international standards are lacking for similar reasons. 
For a safe scale-up of the described promising hydrogen solutions science based and 
validated tools for hydrogen safety engineering and risk informed, performance based, 
international standards specific for LH2 technologies are imperative. 
Therefore the potential for increased handling and distribution of LH2 in the public 
highlights the need to address unanswered questions related to the respective 
prototypical accident scenarios via pre-normative research, thorough laboratory scale 
experimental and theoretical investigations. In particular, appropriate models for the 
flashing multiphase, multicomponent release phenomena, cryogenic plumes and jets, the 
potential for flame acceleration and deflagration-detonation-transition in these 
multiphase mixtures, have to be developed on a new experimental basis. The suitability 
of conventional mitigation techniques needs to be checked carefully and partially overly 
conservative safety distance requirements have to be revised on the basis of an 
improved understanding of the physics and with the help of the new models. The intrinsic 
safety advantages of LH2 over compressed hydrogen offer indeed a high potential for 
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safer, more economic innovative solutions. However, this potential might be used only if 
the required knowledge base is provided. 
5.2 Status at time of last workshop 
At the time of the last workshop in 2014, the following list of issues was compiled as 
needing to be addressed.  
• The complexities of liquid hydrogen put different demands on the modelling of 
releases.  
• The quality and level of detail of experimental data available in literature are 
insufficient to allow complete and accurate validation of CFD.  
• Criteria for model performance in other fields (e.g. LNG) need to be revised for 
hydrogen because of the significant differences in its physical properties. 
• Analytical models have been developed but complete validation is missing 
The behaviour of liquid and cryogenic hydrogen releases featured in two categories of the 
research priorities voting, with this being included in the “Indoor” category, as well as the 
specific “Unintended release-Liquid” category.  “Indoor” ranked 3rd with 13%, and 
"Unintended release-Liquid” ranked 4th with 11%. 
The specific areas of interest for these two categories are given in Table 5.2 and 5.3. 
Table 5.2 Expert ranking within “Indoor Release” topic from 2014 RPW report. 
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Table 5.3 Expert ranking within the topic “Unintended LH2 Release” from 2014 RPW report 
 
5.3 Progress / Working topics 
5.3.1 Cryogenic plumes/ jets 
The behaviour of accidental releases of LH2 is a key area where some studies have 
already been performed, but further investigation is still required. Three large scale 
experimental works are described below (Figure 5.2), and these provide data at a range 
of scales and also demonstrate the phenomena that occur. 
 
Figure 5.2 Scales and key phenomena of LH2 releases 
5.3.1.1 Concentration profiles 
Computational modelling has been used to simulate some of these large scale 
experimental works. For instance, ADREA-HF has been used to simulate HSL 
experimental work [27], see Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3. ADREA-HF Simulations of HSL experiments (from [27]). 
Another example is the application of FLACS to model large scale LH2 spills [28, 29] as 
shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.4: FLACS simulation results of LH2 spills (from [28]). 
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Figure 5.5: FLACS simulation results of LH2 spills compared to experimental data [29]. 
These kind of advanced codes are required to deal with the full range of relevant 
phenomena, including the impact of humidity, and the connection/slip between the 
vapour and non-vapour phases. Large scale experiments often suffer from variable wind, 
or other external factors, challenging their use for model validation. However, data from 
smaller scale experiments, with more control of boundary conditions, are sometimes 
more valuable for model validation [30]. Some small scale experiments have been 
performed, such as those at KIT [31] (Figure 5.6) that showed that the concentration 
decay is less rapid than for gaseous hydrogen, and those at Sandia (Figure 5.7) where an 
ignition and radiation study was performed on cryogenic hydrogen. 
 
Figure 5.6 LH2 release experiments at KIT [31]. 
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Figure 5.7 LH2 release experiments at Sandia 
Distance to flammable limits for cryogenic hydrogen gas have been determined 
experimentally and correlations obtained for a range of temperatures and pressures [20] 
shown in Figure 5.8. 
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Figure 5.8 Correlation for distance to ignition for cryogenic hydrogen (from [20]). 
A cold hydrogen dispersion model has been derived and integrated into HyRAM risk 
modelling tool [32]. However, it still requires further validation. The model does not 
account for any condensation of moisture or air and therefore it has been observed to 
over predict the centerline concentration compared to experimental data for releases at 
80 K as shown in Figure 5.9. 
 
Figure 5.9: Centerline inverse concentration of hydrogen (from [32]). 
Work has been carried out by University Warwick in developing SprayFoam for flashing 
LNG jets, within OpenFOAM, and some validation has been carried out with LPG jets. The 
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model could potentially be adapted for LH2 but would require significant development. 
Other CFD modelling efforts have been performed by several other groups [33-35]6.    
A major issue for model validation is the lack of good experimental data for initial source 
conditions (i.e. within the pipe).  
A group of partners including The Linde Group, FP2Fire, LLNL, SNL and NREL are 
planning a series of large scale release experiments.  The releases will be at height to 
simulate venting as a result of LH2 delivery protocols. The aim of this working topic is to 
establish a robust sampling and analysis system, and obtaining data for model validation. 
5.3.1.2 Jet-fire behaviour 
The modelling of LH2 and cryo-hydrogen jet fires have similar issues. Engineering models 
are available for LH2 jet fires but the effect of liquid droplets is not fully understood. 
However, some work has been carried out to aid understanding. The work of Panda [20] 
on cryo-hydrogen jet fires showed that the gas viscosity has a larger influence in the 
existing flame length correlation previously determined [36] of flame length versus 
Reynolds number. The work of Panda also showed that the radiant fraction data for cryo-
hydrogen plotted versus the flame residence time joins the data for ambient releases but 
the overall trend appears to follows a power law function rather than logarithmic as 
shown in Figure 5.10.  
 
Figure 5.10: Radiant fraction data for cryo-hydrogen plotted versus the flame residence time [20]. 
5.3.2 Other hazards associated with liquid releases 
There are a number of subjects that have previously been identified but for which little 
progress has been made in recent years. 
5.3.2.1 Multi-phase accumulations, ignition and explosion potential 
There has been a basic understanding of this phenomenon for some time. Experiments 
were carried out in the 1960s [37] to investigate the impact sensitivity of mixtures of LH2 
and condensed oxygen. The resultant mixture can be made to detonate with a yield by 
weight greater than that of TNT. 
                                          
6 See also the work presented during the "Liquid Hydrogen session" of the ICHS 2017 (Hamburg). 
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An explosion of ignited LH2 / solid air mixture occurred in experiments at HSL under 
realistic release conditions. In that case the explosion occurred after several seconds of a 
running fire and is not believed to have been driven by impact [26]. Estimates of the 
explosion characteristics were made, although the experiment was not instrumented to 
study such behaviour. 
However, no further progress has been made in really understanding the required 
conditions for this to occur, nor the consequences of such an event. 
5.3.2.2 Pool fires 
There has been limited study of this phenomenon for LH2. Whilst there is a basic 
understanding, potential developments in applications may result in this being of more 
interest (see later). 
5.3.2.3 BLEVE 
The potential for BLEVE behaviour of LH2 storages has been considered in some quarters 
as not a viable event. This is primarily due to the fact that liquid hydrogen tanks are 
double walled and a direct impinging heat load on the inside tank is less probable. This 
heat load is necessary to “boil” the liquid inside the inner tank creating an over pressure 
which may lead to rupture of the tank and a subsequent vapour explosion. 
Potentially initiating events have been observed. In one case the boil-off vent line was 
blocked as a result of water applied by firefighters freezing within it. Conceivably, the 
condensation of air may also result in a similar condition under the right circumstances. 
However, at least in the observed cases a subsequent vapour explosion did not occur. 
5.4 Gaps and Next Steps 
Work has been carried out to define and refine the knowledge gaps in relation to 
modelling of hydrogen behaviour, including LH2 and cryogenic hydrogen, via the EU 
SUSANA project.  
Also, since the last workshop, there have been developments in potential applications of 
LH2 and cryo-hydrogen. 
These aspects are described in the following sections. 
5.4.1 Modelling of LH2 / cryo-hydrogen 
The SUSANA project listed the knowledge gaps pertaining to modelling. These are given 
below. 
Cryogenic compressed releases:  
• More research is required in modelling the two phase chocked releases, problems 
with estimation of the mass flow rate.  
• Evaluation and comparison of the performance of the different Equation of States 
(EOS) in the two phase chocked flow approaches, in order to estimate the mass 
flow rate at the nozzle.  
• A proper correlation for accurately calculating the specific heat capacity of 
hydrogen at low temperatures and high pressures should be further investigated 
and incorporated into CFD codes. 
• Studies on humidity and air condensation during cryogenic compressed releases 
should be undertaken in order to inform modelling of these phenomena. 
Issues with liquid hydrogen releases can be identified in the following subjects:  
• Further development of pool spreading and evapouration models, coupled with 
vapour dispersion.   
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• Comparison between the models that solve the liquid pool separately and the 
models that do not solve the pool separately.   
• Research should be directed at improving the modelling of ground heat flux in 
cases where a liquid pool is formed- for both solid and liquid (usually water) 
substrates.   
• The radiative heat transfer and its contribution to the total heat transfer from the 
air and ground to the cold cloud should also be studied.  
• The source modelling is another key parameter that needs further research 
(isenthalpic vs isentropic) to estimate the flashed vapour fraction. 
• Study regarding turbulence intensity at the source.  
• Humidity and air condensation phenomena need further exploration (effect on 
vapour dispersion and heat flux).  
• Study effect of non-ideal behaviour of hydrogen on CFD predictions in liquid 
releases.   
• Proper correlation for specific heat capacity of hydrogen at low temperatures 
required.  
• Finally, it is essential to carry out additional experiments under more controlled 
conditions, in which all the above key parameters will be measured.   
Many of the knowledge gaps in this area relate to understanding the source terms, 
particularly for two-phase releases at the outlet.  Also, the need for high quality 
experimental data, with good control of variables, is required for model validation. The 
SUSANA project has started to compile an on-line library of experimental data for model 
validation. 
Another aspect that has not been considered to any extent for LH2 is the behaviour in nil-
wind conditions. Experience has shown that other gases and vapours under such 
conditions can result in very small degrees of dispersion, but rather spreading of 
relatively high concentrations by gravity current. The dispersion, and explosion 
behaviour, of cold hydrogen in highly congested areas also warrants better 
understanding. 
5.4.2 Potential issues arising from new technologies 
As described in 5.1.2 large inventories of LH2 may be present in public spaces, in 
congested areas such as railway tunnels, and in harbours, ports etc.  
It has been observed for LNG that the extent of burning surface of a large pool fire is 
limited by the in-draft of air to the base of the fire. The understanding of this in relation 
to LH2 could be of importance for deriving suitable safety distances where this kind of 
event could occur. Similarly, the potential for, and consequences of, BLEVEs of LH2 
storages in fire engulfment scenarios would warrant further understanding. 
5.5 Summary 
Despite some significant improvement in understanding of some areas of the hazard 
behaviour of LH2 and cryo-hydrogen, a number of knowledge gaps still exist in all of the 
areas including dispersion indoors and outdoors, jet and pool fires, solids (oxygen)/liquid 
hydrogen explosions, general ignition and BLEVE/fire resistance. 
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6  Applications  
Chair: Thomas Jordan (KIT) - Participants and contributors: Wolfram Fleck (Daimler), 
Frank Graf (DVGW), Gerhard Krühsel (DLR), Pratap Sathiah (Shell) and Benno 
Weinberger (INERIS) 
6.1 Status at the time of the previous workshop 
Applications have been addressed only vaguely in the previous workshops and associated 
reports. In 2012 the industry representatives mainly highlighted their respective 
technology and only very limited insights in safety related issues were provided. The 
same applies to the 2014 version of the workshop, where Applications ranked on last 
position by common voting of the participants coming from research and from industry. 
One reason for this low rank might be that the whole process became rather phenomena 
and tools oriented and the scenarios dimension, which provided the actual motivation to 
certain phenomena, were actually lost. Consequently, no suitable sub-structure had been 
established within the application session. Only few applications were listed and voted in 
2014, mainly motivated by corresponding presentations of workshop participants. 
Table 6.1: Ranking of Sub-Topics within the Application Session 10 derived from the RPW2014 
report 
 
In fact, only the Sub-Topic 10.3 “Vehicle tank protection” was discussed in more detail 
and therefore corresponding priorities have been derived in the RPW2014 report. One 
priority addresses the vehicle fire scenario and the protection of the vehicle tank against 
thermal loads. The second priority was suggested by a dedicated presentation, 
highlighting potential over-conservative requirements for the 700 bar cold filling 
standards (SAE). 
6.2 Motivation of a dedicated “Application” Session 
Differently from the workshop in 2014 this time an emphasis on applications was placed. 
The explanation is that applications bridge phenomena and safety issues, representing 
the research “sphere” with its phenomena thinking on one side, and the industry 
“sphere” with its predominant risk orientation on the other. 
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Fig. 6.1: Applications linking “Safety Research” and “Industry Risk” perspectives 
For risk and finally safety assessments, the application has to be embedded in a set of 
real world scenarios. The application might then favor or suppress certain phenomena. 
The engineer involved in a risk assessment of an innovative hydrogen application will 
select credible scenarios and then will try to identify what was the initiating event, driven 
by which phenomena, and what will be the consequences, again based on the 
phenomena which will be involved in the chain of events characterizing the whole 
incident. So the industry based engineer will always take the “industry” perspective, 
motivated by designing and marketing safe products, i.e. real world applications. The 
researcher on the other side wants to improve the understanding of the special behaviour 
of hydrogen, often independent of a specific product or application.  
Although science always tries to be profound and complete, pre-normative work has to 
be driven by anticipating the innovative applications, which are close to enter the market. 
This is substantiated by the need of the industry to apply most suitable standards and, 
even beyond, to account for the state-of-the-art for designing, building and operating 
safe applications. So the relevant state-of-the-art and specific standards should reflect an 
appropriate level of understanding the relevant phenomena. The state-of-the-art is 
referring to published results of research, like validated physical models, which steadily 
extend the state of knowledge with respect to the relevant phenomena. So promising 
innovative applications (i.e. the middle of the Figure 6.1) define the relevant scenarios to 
be investigated by the industry based developers (right hand, red side of Figure 6.1). On 
the other side (i.e. left hand, green side of Figure 6.1) those scenarios highlight certain 
phenomena, which have to be addressed by research. Without real applications we 
cannot select credible scenarios, nor rank phenomena on a risk/safety dimension. 
6.3 Sub-structure of the “Application” session  
Following the background described above and based on input provided by industry the 
organisers and the chairperson decided to focus on the following applications, Sub-Topics 
respectively: 
 a) Hydrogen Fueling Station HFS 
 b) Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle FCEV 
 c) Power-to-Hydrogen 
 d) Aeronautics / Aerospace  
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For each application at least one representative expert from the respective industry was 
invited to report as panelist on recent findings, current work and new topics to be 
addressed. 
6.3.1 Hydrogen Fueling Station (HFS) 
6.3.1.1 Progress 
The panelist Pratap Sathiah, Shell, referred to several high pressure dispersion and 
explosion experiments performed in the past. Some of them have been used in validation 
and benchmarking exercises of CFD and risk assessment tools. However, in particular for 
high pressure releases there are still open issues, mainly when it comes to safety 
distances for jets interacting with neighboring structures, i.e. wall attachment or 
impingement. 
Some modelling work has been done related to the effect of fast filling on the vehicle 
tank and pre-cooling on the coupling itself. Effective simplified calculation procedures for 
the temperature distribution and histories reached by the SAE standardized fueling or 
alternative protocols have been developed.  
In the field of risk assessment, some first field experience with HFSs has been shared 
openly, helping to define credible scenarios, and some assessments of the special issues 
related to co-location, i.e. multi-fuel stations, has been published. Several papers 
presented at the ICHS2015 Special Session “Safety of Fueling” (Chair: Guy Dang-Nhu) 
reflect well the progress made by 2015, 2016 respectively [38-44]. In general, the recent 
activities of the Working Group 24 of ISO TC197, dedicated to the development of a new 
international standard for HFSs, stimulated further activities in these fields. Interestingly 
one of those recently adopted topics is dedicated to the potentially worst case scenario, 
the catastrophic failure of a vehicle on-board pressure vessel in the vicinity of a HFS, e.g. 
during fueling, and the ability of the fueling infrastructure to cope with this. Several 
accidents with CNG vehicles (see Figure 6.2 for instance) prove that such kind of 
accidents have to be included in the set of credible scenarios for a HFS also. 
 
Fig.6.2: Lessons to be learnt from recent CNG vessel failure in Duderstadt,, Germany on 9.9.2016.  
Driver seriously injured; ARAL and other fuel suppliers stopped CNG fueling of all VW CNG cars.  
(Claims: “driver was informed before, not to fuel with CNG”; “there was no explosion”); Source: 
Arne Bänsch 
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6.3.1.2 Gaps and Next Steps 
The following list of open issues, new directions respectively, have been identified. 
 Adverse effects on material and systems in below design, idling conditions 
(corrosion, low frequency and T cycles,…) 
 Lack of engineering models accounting for mitigation measures appropriately 
 Over conservative expensive design raising safety and efficiency concerns (e.g. 
alarm limits, electrical grounding of busses and cooling requirements) 
 Still strong doubts about safety within authorities, public and users (drivers) 
caused in particular by the catastrophic rupture scenario of the vehicle tank 
 Material and processing (welding) issues for high pressure components 
 Effect of compressor vibrations on material, joints and pressure equipment in 
general 
 Still open ventilation requirements for containers of compressor  
 Suitable models for hydrogen dispersion, jet fire and explosion in particular for 
scale-up (large bus fleets, trains,….) and real world boundary conditions (jet wall 
attachment or impingement, wind conditions, etc) encountered at the HFS 
6.3.1.3 Conclusions for the HFS application 
Most of the open issues are related to the phenomena mixing, ignition and combustion 
including mitigation strategies, few concern material compatibility. Scaling up HFS 
services implies including the effect of LH2 in these investigations. Most relevant 
scenarios are fire, pressure vessel rupture and explosions including missile effects. For 
risk assessment the previously highest ranked topic of suitable engineering tools is valid 
as well., The required set of relevant models for these accidental phenomena has to be 
completed, integrated and validated urgently. Only this way the flexibility offered with 
the new performance oriented standards may be exploited for reaching required safety 
levels most economically. 
6.3.2 Hydrogen (Fuel Cell) Electric Vehicles (FCEV) 
6.3.2.1 Reference point RPW2014 
As described in the introduction of the Application chapter the highest ranked and 
broadest discussed Sub-Topic at the RPW2014 was “Vehicle tank protection” (see Table 
6.2 above). The main conclusion from the RPW2014 was that there exist considerably 
over-conservative pre-cooling requirements. Therefore, more detailed analyses of and 
better engineering models for the temperature evolution during standard (SAE) 
compliant fueling was suggested. Although this topic was already touched upon in the 
HFS application and shows up here again, it actually relates to the dedicated on-board 
storage session. 
6.3.2.2 Progress 
Automotive OEMs invest in safety related research and development, but for several 
obvious reasons this work is not openly communicated, nor shared among their peers. 
Published work always relates to design independent issues, deals rather on an abstract 
level with phenomena or in best case relates to emerging standards or regulation. 
Some modelling work has been done related to the effect of fast filling on the vehicle 
tank and pre-cooling on the coupling itself. Effective simplified calculation procedures for 
the temperature distribution and histories reached by the SAE standardized fueling or 
alternative protocols have been developed and presented. 
At the ICHS2015 Special Session “Safety of Fueling” (Chair: Guy Dang-nhu) progress 
made by 2015 was captured in a few presentation [41, 42]. Further work has been done 
related to the bonfire test procedures of the GTR #13. Some results related to the 
thermal protection and some first ideas for identifying state of TPRD after fire/accident 
have been presented at ICHS2015 [43, 44]. 
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Ongoing work is addressing Pressure Peaking Phenomena and effects of blast induced by 
rupture of high pressure on-board storage. 
6.3.2.3 Gaps and Next Steps 
 Operations 
o State of health monitoring of pressure vessel (fatigue, after crash, 
thermal events, misuse), non-destructive testing 
 Leakage/venting related tasks 
o H2 leakage in garages or in tunnels 
o Venting of H2 via TPRD in narrow spaces as a single car garage 
o Remotely initiated venting 
 Fire 
o Complex accident situation in tunnels 
o Vehicle fire (different locations) and response of storage components to 
thermal excursion 
o Improved protection in particular of on-board storage against fire and 
thermal excursions 
 Extreme events 
o Improved protection against extreme events 
o Pressure vessel rupture mitigation 
 Rescue and first responders Post Crash event 
o Identification of tank SOC status (after fire or crash) to protect first 
responders 
o Identification of tank structure integrity after crash for first and  
second responders 
6.3.2.4 Conclusions 
Most of the open issues are related to the topic “On-board Storage” which was treated 
separately in the workshop. However, from a scenario perspective the closed or partially 
closed scenarios: FCV involved in a fire in a private or public garage, in a tunnel or at a 
fueling stations still represent the most critical issues. These scenarios include the critical 
issue of safe strategies for first and second responders and concepts for avoiding or at 
least mitigating catastrophic pressure vessel ruptures. 
6.3.3 Power-to-Hydrogen PtH 
6.3.3.1 Progress 
Several Power-to-Hydrogen injection plants were connected to the natural gas grid. In 
Germany, for instance several Power-to-Gas including 8 Power-to-Hydrogen 
demonstration projects are in operation. Hydrogen injection in natural gas grid is 
addressed in various initiatives (e.g. Hyready, HIPSNET) and the limits for the hydrogen 
fraction in the existing gas infrastructure have been investigated broadly (e.g. Naturalhy, 
GERG, DVGW). In a general conclusion 2 vol.-% hydrogen are considered non-critical for 
the existing gas infrastructure.  
First national standards were realized (e.g. DVGW G 265-3 for hydrogen injection 
plants). However, the general picture with respect to standards still looks fragmented, at 
least when it comes to transnational or international frameworks. 
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Fig. 6.3: PtG (green logos) and PtH (blue logos) projects in Germany 
For different blends of hydrogen in methane the following important characteristic 
properties have been determined7: 
 Upper and lower flammability limits at SATP 
 Pmax and dp/dt max and limit concentration for gas mixture characterization 
(Hydrogen H2- Natural Gas NG still in same class as NG) 
 Flame temperatures, thermal radiation of the flame, viscosity of gas (mass flow) 
at SATP 
 Minimum safety experimental gap / Minimum Ignition Current at SATP 
 Flame length of H2-NG mixtures 
There is ongoing work related to the characterization of the detonation sensitivity of H2-
NG mixtures via measurements of the induction time in shock tubes and rapid 
compression machines. 
                                          
7 This work has been recently accomplished by the group of V. Schroeder, BAM and was presented at least 
partially at the WHEC 2016 in Zaragoza and at a DECHEMA conference in Freiburg: 15th International 
Symposium on Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries and accompanying 
exhibition 5 - 8 June 2016 Konzerthaus Freiburg, Germany. 
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6.3.3.2 Gaps and Next Steps 
The following list reflects the open issues identified at the RPW2016 related to the safety 
issues of the used gas grid, mainly pointing to H2 embrittlement and assisted corrosion
8:
  
 List of materials compatible with H2-NG systems, taking into account already 
collected data and available standardization deliverables such as the technical 
report ISO/TR 15916:2004 7. 
 Behaviour of H2 in H2-NG on plastics pipes, valves, fittings in house gas 
installations, storage cylinders - effect on components 
 Metering (additionally supported by the recommendations of the EC RCS strategy 
coordination group) and mixture concentration and homogeneity control9  
 Influence of hydrogen on integrity of underground pore storages 
o hydrogen induced microbiological reactions 
o permeation effects 
For the bullet points on hydrogen storage in underground caverns, results have been 
provided by projects HyUnder and H2Store. Some additional insights might be derived 
from investigations of nuclear waste storage. 
The common objective of the topics above is to reach a general consensus and suitable 
standards for hydrogen concentrations beyond 10 vol.-% in the gas supply infrastructure 
in the near future. 
Further gaps or research directions relate to10: 
 Testing procedures, such as the fatigue life test should be reviewed together with 
industry 
 Materials compatibility with the Cr-Mg steels used for CNG vehicle tanks.  
 Effects on industrial and residential burners, this also includes standardization and 
certification issues (use of test gases for example).  
 Correlation between specimen and component tests for the characterization of 
susceptibility to hydrogen embrittlement and enhanced fatigue 
 Effect of larger concentration of H2 in H2/NG on flame stability in standard burners 
 All kinds of mitigating safety measures (TPRD, Explosion Protection Systems, etc.) 
have to be certified for H2/NG 
 Re-assessment of the ATEX Zoning should be standardized for H2/NG 
 Collect available field data from Power-to-H2 installations 
 Training about the safety aspects of H2/H2NG 
6.3.3.3 Conclusions 
Most of the open issues are material related. Compared to the other applications, this 
application has matured considerably. In general, the impact of gas composition on end-
users still has to be assessed. However, support for international harmonized 
standardization is required for transnational solutions and to demonstrate a common and 
openly communicated knowledge base related to this application. High temperature and 
                                          
8 The following issue was not directly discussed during the Research Priority Workshop, but raised nevertheless 
by contributors afterwards: 
 Hydrogen interaction with salt within the cavity and the surrounding rock mass  
o development of multi-scale numerical models able to describe and predict the geochemical 
and thermo-hydro-mechanical behavior of hydrogen in saline cavities and their surroundings 
9 A joint working group WELMEC WG 11, CEN TC 237, FARECOGAZ and MARCOGAZ is finalizing an overview on 
the expected behavior of the actual meter types when renewable gases like biogas, mixture of hydrogen and 
natural gas-hydrogen are used. 
10 The following gaps were not directly discussed during the Research Priority Workshop, but raised 
nevertheless by contributors afterwards: 
• Analyze the conditions of economic viability of underground storage and their societal acceptability at 
European level 
• Evaluate the safety conditions of hydrogen storage and put in place appropriate monitoring for risk 
management 
• Effect of H2 in H2/NG on flame kinetics and the acoustic influence on rotational machinery 
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pressure electrolysis will involve new safety issues which should be addressed 
appropriately. 
6.3.4 Aeronautics / Aerospace 
Although this application is not directly pushing the general introduction of hydrogen as 
an energy carrier, hydrogen has been and still is the most promising fuel propellant for 
chemical space propulsion motors of space launch systems and an attractive alternative 
for fossil fuels in aircrafts. The invited Aeronautics expert cancelled the participation. This 
is why there is an Aerospace focus in this application domain. 
Since 1990 the operational experience of LH2 fueled rocket stages was continuously 
extended in Western Europe. The dimensioning of the test facilities, the necessary safety 
systems and safe operation conditions are challenges still today. Due to the large 
inventories and huge power ratings, test operation suffers from many limitations, for 
instance space. New technologies for measurement command and control of test 
processes are needed and if no suitable solutions are provided, the testing itself might 
impose limits to the actual application. 
6.3.4.1 Progress 
At DLR site Lampoldshausen a new test facility P5.2 was designed to test the Ariane 
upper stage. An engineering safety study contained a study of blast expansion either at 
atmosphere or at vacuum (confined) conditions. The worst-case scenario considered was 
a ruptured 70m3 LH2 tank structure where a sudden release and exposure of big quantity 
of LH2 to ambiance was assumed. 
The study of blast expansion has been performed at EMI, Freiburg where computational 
tool Apollo has been applied. The yield of the blast depends on the amount of ignitable 
(premixed) hydrogen gas, which in this application has to be evapourated from liquid 
state. However, in particular the prediction of the phase change is very difficult and 
represents an open issue. 
6.3.4.2 Gaps and Next Steps 
Open issues related to multiphase phenomena: 
 Evapourated fraction when large inventories of LH2 are suddenly released to 
atmosphere. (Initial conditions for explosion and detonation) 
 Multi-phase physical processes (heat transfer, mixing with air, initial 
thermodynamic status of the liquid) largely unknown 
 Probability of occurrence of detonation with respect to heterogeneously premixed  
gaseous cloud 
o Under which conditions a deflagration may be assumed 
o Where are the limits of forecast (deflagration/detonation)? 
 For the scenario of complete rupture of LH2 and Liquid OXygen LOX tank, 
consequences of complete release inside the pool (at the bottom of the test 
facility) 
o Secondary effects and controlled burn down 
o LH2/LOX mixture behaviour 
Open issues related to appropriate mitigation measures for the test cell design: 
 Devices to restrict the amount of premixed hydrogen/air gas clouds  
 Application of glow plugs near test specimen (spatial arrangement)  
 Effect in case of ignition close to the test specimen (LH2/LOX stage) 
 Detection of small intern/extern hydrogen leakages (maybe by visual methods) 
 Devices for remote controlled detection of hydrogen leakages 
upstream/downstream at the filling line to the stage  within 5 min  
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Safe operation of LH2/LOX upper stage 
● Avoidance of sudden boil off situations inside the LH2 liquid body inside a tank  
● Releases with high LH2 flow rates via vent/flare stack including the possibility to 
release liquid at the stack orifice (large scale vertical two-phase “flushing” 
releases) 
● Large scale validation experiments for simulation of multiphase flow and heat 
transfer (application to “common bulkhead failure” scenario) 
Besides the cryogenic state of hydrogen sub-atmospheric pressure environment 
represents another peculiarity of these applications. Open issues in this regard are:  
● Hydrogen ignition (ignition conditions, flame propagation, ...) at sub-atmospheric 
pressure (some work has been done in this field by KIT for the fusion reactor 
application).  
● Venting hydrogen outboard has to take into account airship safety (this situation 
may arise while in-flight and safety must still be ensured during such operation). 
Typical criteria to take into account are : 
o Lightning effects / protection means and strategies, 
o H2 plume mixing (high velocity of aircraft) and size of ignitable plume,  
o Ignition physics (low external pressure, low temperature, ...),  
o Consequence of plume ignition on aircraft (flame characteristics, radiated 
heat, ...). 
6.3.4.3 Conclusions for the Aerospace/Aeronautics application 
The dominance of cryogenic LH2 links this application to the problems, which are implied 
with the scale up of the hydrogen supply infrastructure for transport applications, i.e. the 
HFS application. The common issues related to LH2 and the relatively limited 
understanding of associated phenomena yield highest rank for LH2. 
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7 Storage  
Chair: Dr. Hervé Barthélémy (Air Liquide) - Participants and contributors: Prof. Dr. 
Jinyang Zheng (Zhejiang University) and Jan Kunberger (BMW) 
Efficient storage of hydrogen is crucial for the success of hydrogen energy markets (early 
markets as well as transportation market). Hydrogen can be stored either as a 
compressed gas, a refrigerated liquefied gas, a cryo-compressed gas or in solids such has 
hydrides. This session focused on compressed and cryo-compressed storage. It gave an 
overview of hydrogen storage research & development status & priorities as discussed 
during IA-HySafe Research Priorities Workshop in Petten, September 2016. 
7.1 Compressed hydrogen storage 
7.1.1 Overview compressed hydrogen storage  
Hydrogen can be stored in four types of pressure vessels as presented in Figure 7.1. The 
pressure vessels are generally cylinders but they can also be polygons or toroid. Metallic 
pressure vessels are known as type I. Type II pressure vessels consist in a thick metallic 
liner hoop wrapped on the cylindrical part with a fiber resin composite. The fully 
composites materials based pressure vessels (designated by COPV) are made of a plastic 
or metallic liner wrapped with carbon fibers embedded in a polymer matrix (filament 
winding). When the liner contributes to the mechanical resistance (more than 5%), the 
COPV is of type III (mostly metal liner). Otherwise, the COPV is of type IV (mainly 
polymer liner or seldom extremely thin metal liner).  
 
Figure 7.1: Representation of type I, II, III and IV COPV 11 
7.1.2 Key characteristics 
The table 7.1 presents the main feature of the different type of pressure vessels.  
Table 7.1: Key characteristics of compressed gas storage pressure vessels 
 Technology maturity Cost 
performance 
Weight 
performance 
Type I Pressure limited to 50 MPa , ++ ++ - 
Type II Pressure not limited, + + 0 
Type III For P ≤ 45 MPa (difficulty to pass pressure cycling 
requirements for 70 MPa, [2]) 
- + 
Type 
IV 
For P ≤ 100 MPa  – First commercial series – liner 
behaviour in gas to be further studied 
- ++ 
7.1.3 R&D status & challenges 
The compatibility of the gas with the materials chosen and the impact of operating 
conditions on the materials and the tank structure have to be assessed. The whole 
                                          
fueling station, Takuya M 
Liner (metal) Boss (metal)
Type III
Liner (polymer)
Boss - liner 
junction
Composite (fiber + resin)
Type IV
All Metal
(Steel or 
Aluminum)
0.8 to 1.6 Kg/L
TYPE I CYLINDERS
Metal liner hoop-
wrapped with 
carbon or glass 
fibers
0.5 to 1.4 Kg/L
TYPE II CYLINDERS
Composite (fiber + resin)
Type I Type II
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pressure lifecycle has to be considered: storage, transportation, use (emptying, handling, 
etc), filling steps including gas quality management, periodic inspection and 
maintenance. The objective is to prevent the risk of failure by burst or leak in service and 
guarantee the tank performance.  
Table 7.2: Summary of R&D challenges 
 
Composites pressure vessels have been operated for some decades for different 
applications. Commercial products are now available with 700 bar working pressure. 
Thanks to international R&D efforts, strong progress has been made in the different fields 
listed in table 7.2 [45, 46]. It has been emphasized during the workshop, that the results 
of those studies should be further shared with scientific, industrial and normative 
community. Questions remain mainly on:  
- Need for ageing models considering liner collapse and other mechanical loads and 
influencing operating parameters => Definition of test protocols to define material 
selection test and criteria to qualify the solution for H2 high pressure cylinder.  
- Assessment of the effect of temperature excursions and overheating on cylinder 
lifetime.  
- modelling damage induced by impacts and lifetime assessment (including metal 
liner) and structural health monitoring. 
- Need Non Destructive Examination methods for ensuring constant manufacturing 
quality, e. g. required performance (number of cycles, tightness). 
- need for new cylinder & fire solutions design for smart and reliable fire detection 
and protection (TPRD, protections, fire detections, heat conduction to promote 
liner melting, etc).  
- need for modelling tools of fire scenarios (fire, temperature and radiative effect 
levels, temperature of the cylinder, etc). Predictive tools of burst time in fire have 
been recently developed in FiRECOMP FCH-JU project [47].  
- Recycling.- 
Note that the list above is not made by priority.  
7.2 High Pressure Stationary Vessels12 
Stationary hydrogen storage traditionally adopts seamless pressure vessels. However, 
seamless pressure vessels are limited in volume according to the ASME Boiler and 
Pressure Vessel Code Ⅷ Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels Division 1, UF and 
Appendix 22. Moreover, by increasing operating pressure, the problems of hydrogen 
embrittlement and cost become issues [48].  
                                          
12 This issue was discussed during the Research Priority Workshop, but not included in the priorities voting; 
however the organizers felt it was important to include it in this report. 
 General R&D Gaps
 Ageing models for lifetime 
assessment of materials & 
structure
 Need NDT for ensuring 
constant manufacturing 
quality and e.g. required 
performance (number of 
cycles, tightness, etc)
 Recycling
 Heat  management during 
filling
 Metal parts (boss, liner) => See Materials Compatibility Session
 H2 embrittlement (causes loss of fracture toughness) – H2 enhanced fatigue
 Premature failure in fatigue (due to HE and/or cycling, in particular at HP)
 Polymer liner => See Materials Compatibility Session
 Gas permeation – Liner collapse
 Mechanical loads and durability – Criteria for liner materials selection
 Boss-Liner Junction
 Tightness of boss – liner junction
 Bonding material selection & qualification (if any)
 Composite Structure
 Effects on damage & lifetime of static & cyclic pressure, temperature, 
environment, accidental loads (impact, fire)
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In order to increase storage quantity, multi-vessel assembly is usually used, which 
inevitably increases hydrogen leak points, making management and safety monitoring 
more difficult [49].  
Large composite pressure vessels can also be utilized for stationary hydrogen storage, 
which is expected to replace seamless pressure vessel for higher-pressure conditions, 
such as 45 MPa and 90 MPa. In order to achieve this objective, manufacturing costs will 
have to be reduced, especially the cost of carbon fiber [50].  
Recently, a novel steel/concrete composite hydrogen storage vessel has been designed, 
which comprises a layered steel vessel encased in an outer pre-stressed concrete sleeve. 
Yet its reliability and safety still have to be further validated. A unique multifunctional 
steel layered vessel (MSLV) for stationary hydrogen storage was developed to deal with 
the aforementioned problems [51]. In addition, a Chinese national standard13 was issued 
in 2011.  
Compared with traditional seamless pressure vessels, MSLV is flexible in design, 
convenient in fabrication, safe in use and easy for online safety monitoring. The 77 MPa 
and 47 MPa MSLVs had been successfully used in hydrogen refueling station design. 
7.3 Cryo-compressed storage  
Cryo-compressed storage combines properties of both compressed gaseous hydrogen 
and liquefied hydrogen storage systems. It is developed to minimize the boil-off loss 
(dormancy) from liquefied hydrogen storage while retaining a higher system energy 
density. Hydrogen is stored in an insulated tank that can accept cryogenic temperatures 
(20K) and high pressure (at least 30 MPa) at ambient temperature. The fact that the 
tank is able to withstand high pressures allows greater pressure increases before 
hydrogen has to be boiled off. Such cryogenic pressure vessels significantly extend the 
time before starting evapourative losses when they are in operation and thus increase 
storage autonomy. 
As an example, the BMW Group has started validation of cryo-compressed hydrogen 
storage for hydrogen vehicles with high energy and long range requirements [52, 53]. 
The diagram depicted in Figure 7.2 reported by BMW, shows that cryo-compressed H2 
enables high storage density (80 g/l). The cryogenic gas is denser than liquid hydrogen. 
 
Figure 7.2: Hydrogen density versus pressure and temperature from BMW 
The tank consists of a type III composite pressure vessel with a metallic liner that is 
encapsulated in a secondary insulated jacket, whose role is to limit heat transfer between 
the hydrogen and the environment. More details on the cryo-compressed storage tank 
design can be found in scientific literature [54].  
                                          
13 GB/T 26466-2011 Stationary flat steel ribbon wound vessels for storage of high pressure hydrogen 
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An identified gap is the improvement of the insulation function.  
7.4 Gaps and Next Steps  
Topic Identified R&D Gaps 
Compressed Storage 
Cylinder design & testing 
-Need for ageing models considering liner 
collapse and other mechanical loads and 
influencing operating parameters => 
Designation of test protocols to define 
material selection test and criteria to 
qualify solutions for H2 HP cylinder. 
 -Effect of overheating on lifetime ? 
Recycling Need for recycling approach 
Cylinder Manufacturing 
Need for Non Destructive Examination 
methods for ensuring constant 
manufacturing quality, e. g. required 
performance (number of cycles, tightness) 
Fire Safety 
need for modelling tools of fire scenarios 
(fire, temperature and radiative effect 
levels, temperature of the cylinder, etc). 
Predictive tools of burst time in fire have 
been recently developed in Firecomp FCH-
JU project.  
Fire Safety 
need for new cylinder & fire solutions 
design for smart and reliable fire detection 
and protection (TPRD, protections, fire 
detections, heat conduction to promote 
liner melting, etc)  
Damage & inspection 
Modelling damage induced by impacts and 
lifetime assessment (including metal liner) 
and structural health monitoring 
Cryo Compressed storage improvement of insulation function 
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8 Materials  
Chair: Iñaki Azkarate - Participants and contributors: Beatriz Acosta Iborra (JRC), 
Mathilde Weber (Air Liquide), Chris San Marchi (SNNL) and Laurent Briottet (CEA). 
8.1 Hydrogen effect on Materials 
Materials for industrial applications are selected according to several factors, and service 
conditions have great impact on this choice. Hydrogen mainly affects materials in their 
mechanical properties. Depending of the material's nature, metal or polymer, hydrogen 
can impact it in different ways. 
In the case of metals, the phenomenon behind hydrogen effects is the hydrogen 
molecule (H2) splitting into two atoms, which then enter the material in this atomic state 
and causes the deleterious effects. 
This does not occur in the case of polymers, for which the effect is more based on the 
permeability, diffusivity and solubility of H2. 
Results can sometimes show the same kind of patterns (blisters, cracks,..), but the 
reasons behind these visible phenomena, can be based on different mechanisms. 
8.1.1 Hydrogen Damage in Metals 
8.1.1.1 Hydrogen induced cracking (HIC) 
Atomic hydrogen diffuses in the material and recombines to form H2 at specific sites 
(microcracks, inclusions,..). This molecular hydrogen (H2) can accumulate and develop 
high pressures. In ductile materials, these pressures can deform the material producing 
blisters. In the case of materials with low ductility, cracking can occur. It can then 
propagate in a stepwise manner (Stepwise Cracking, SWC) 
8.1.1.2 Hydrogen reaction 
Hydrogen can also react with metallic phases forming hydrides (Ti, Zr,..) or react with 
non-metallic phases (carbides) forming methane (CH4) or other compounds 
8.1.1.3 Hydrogen Embrittlement (HE) or Hydrogen Stress cracking (HSC) 
This type of failure can take place when atomic hydrogen enters in contact with a 
material that is under stress (applied or residual). In fact sometimes is considered as a 
type of Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC). If a component already has a crack, it is 
possible for hydrogen stress cracking to begin at the already existing crack. 
8.1.1.4 Mechanisms of Hydrogen Embrittlement in metals.  
In the following more details on the mechanism behind hydrogen damage in metal will be 
given [55-60]. 
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- Hydrogen Enhanced Dechoesion Mechanism (HEDE) 
 
The decohesion mechanism is one of the earliest mechanisms proposed for hydrogen 
embrittlement (HE). 
This mechanism is based on the postulate that solute hydrogen decreases the forces 
required to separate the crystal along a crystallographic plane. 
There is a decrease in atom binding forces of the metal lattice, which can result in 
premature brittle fracture. The brittle fracture may be in the form of either intergranular 
or transgranular cleavage. 
The decohesion mechanism considers that there is a critical concentration of hydrogen 
atoms for which brittle fracture occurs. 
This mechanism could be applied for intergranular fracture, where high concentration of 
hydrogen accumulates at grain boundaries (reaching the critical concentration for brittle 
fracture) 
- Hydrogen Enhanced Localised Plasticity Mechanism (HELP) 
 
According to this model the failure occurs by locally ductile processes. 
This mechanism is based on the fact that the presence of hydrogen in solid solution 
increases the mobility of dislocations and creates localized high deformation regions. 
The reason of this increased mobility is attributed to reduction of interactions between       
dislocations and between dislocations and other obstacles (such as carbon atoms, grain 
boundaries) when hydrogen is present. 
Dislocations thus move closer to each other, and closer to obstacles, and produce denser 
or more compact pile-ups when hydrogen is present. 
The result of this is that microscopic regions of high deformation (where hydrogen 
increases the mobility of dislocations) are surrounding less ductile zones where 
dislocations are closely packed. The applied stress is then concentrated on these hard 
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zones that represent only a small portion of the cross section. When the tensile stress in 
these small portions is higher than the ultimate tensile strength, failure occurs. 
At present there is a large amount of experimental observations, by in- situ transmission 
electron microscopy that are supporting this mechanism. The fact that the effect of 
hydrogen on dislocations mobility is not dependent on the type of dislocation (edge, 
screw or mixed) and that it is present for different crystallographic structures, suggests 
that the HELP mechanism could be universal. 
- Hydride Induced Embrittlement  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hydride-induced embrittlement is a second-phase mechanism that involves the 
nucleation and growth of an extensive hydride field ahead of a crack.  
It has been observed that hydrides first nucleate in the stress field of a crack and then 
grow to large sizes not by the growth of individual hydrides but by the nucleation and 
growth of new hydrides in the stress field. 
The auto-catalytic process of hydride nucleation and growth together with their brittle 
nature seems to be the main cause of embrittlement of V, Nb, Ti and Zr. 
8.1.2 Hydrogen Damage in Polymers 
There are many differences between metals and polymers. The properties of polymers 
depend not only on their chemical structure, but on a variety of other factors. The most 
important of these are molecular weight (and molecular weight distribution) of polymer 
chains, and processing history.  
For example, the degree of crystallinity of a polymer is affected by its cooling rate from 
the molten state. Processing techniques like extrusion can induce orientation and 
extension of polymer chains, influencing properties. Fillers, plasticizers, crosslinking 
agents, and other additives are often incorporated to modify polymer's properties. Thus a 
tremendous variety may be associated with a single polymer. 
Unlike metals, polymer properties are affected by hydrostatic pressure. 
Polymers are not subject to hydrogen embrittlement in the same ways as metals. 
Hydrogen absorbed by polymers exists as a diatomic molecule; it does not dissociate as 
it is known to do in metals.  
Four classes based on polymer microstructure are considered in the following. Two 
thermoplastics, and two crosslinked into networks by curing treatment. 
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●  Semicrystalline thermoplastics (PE, HDPE, PP, PEEK, PTFE,..) 
●  Fully amorphous thermoplastics (PVC,..) 
●  Elastomers (rubbers, butadiene, chloroprene, fluoroelastomers,…) 
●  Epoxies (epoxy resins) 
8.2 Materials and hydrogen in standards 
Main standard considering materials in a general way and their suitability for hydrogen 
service is ISO TR 15916:2015 Basic considerations for the safety of hydrogen systems. 
8.2.1 Recent Progress 
Recent progress in other standards has been carried out in: 
● ASME Article KD-10: hydrogen pressure vessels. Fracture mechanics approach 
(fatigue crack growth and fracture), 
● SAE J2579: on-board hydrogen fuel systems. Fatigue life approach (includes slow 
strain rate tensile testing),  
● CSA CHMC1: general test methods in gaseous hydrogen (metallic). Fracture, 
fatigue and tensile testing for metallic materials, 
● CSA HPIT1: gaseous hydrogen fuel systems for industrial trucks. Guidance specific 
to Cr-Mo pressure vessel steel with conservative design philosophy,  
● ISO 11114-4: specific to transportable gas cylinders. Several methods to evaluate 
transportable pressure vessel steels. 
8.2.2 Current Activities 
Activities are currently under way in: 
● ASME Article KD-10: hydrogen pressure vessels. Expanding scope to ASME SA-
723 steels (international partnership), 
● SAE J2579: on-board hydrogen fuel systems. Developing testing capability for 
low-temperature fatigue and coordination of testing activities through SAE and 
national programs,  
● CSA CHMC1: general test methods in gaseous hydrogen (metallic). Evaluating 
fatigue-life methods by exploring parameter space (e.g., temperature, frequency, 
load ratio), 
● CSA CHMC2: general test methods in gaseous hydrogen (polymers). Committee 
not yet active. 
Test method development is underway at US DOE National Laboratories, but limited in 
scope. 
8.2.3 Gaps and Next Steps 
Some gaps are identified: 
● ASME Article KD-10: hydrogen pressure vessels. Available data is limited. Poor 
efficiency of fatigue crack growth testing methods. Fracture method is not 
conservative. 
● SAE J2579: on-board hydrogen fuel systems. Still evolving: lacks consensus on 
methods and metrics. Existing metrics are overly conservative (precludes rational 
basis for selection of materials). 
● CSA CHMC1: general test methods in gaseous hydrogen (metallic). Lacks 
internationally accepted metrics for qualification of materials. 
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● ISO 11114-4: specific to transportable gas cylinders. Methods are not equivalent 
and may not be conservative (new version coming soon). Does not address 
fatigue. Cannot be applied to other materials, systems or components. 
● In general: No standards for hydrogen compatibility of polymer materials 
8.3 Research Priorities 
Main contributors to results and comments provided below were the following 
organizations: 
Metals: Air Liquide, CCS Global, CEA, CSM, ENSMA, Hydrogenius, I2CENER, JRC, KRISS, 
Kyushu University, LSPM, NPL, SINTEF, SNL,TECNALIA, Tenaris, TWI, VTT. 
Polymers: Air Liquide, Hexgon-Lincoln/HSECOE, JRC, NREL, Nanosonic, ORNL, PNNL, 
PPRIME ISAE-ENSMA, SNL, Toyota. 
8.4 Progress made in the last three to four years 
8.4.1 Metals 
The evaluation of test methods to define mechanical properties in H2 environment: 
toughness, fatigue, fretting fatigue (definition of specimens) and understanding of the 
most appropriate testing parameters (pressure, frequency) based on: 
 - fracture mechanics (toughness: KIC, KIH, fatigue: da/dN vs. K) 
 - non-cracked samples (fretting fatigue, disc-fatigue samples) 
have been carried out.  
The Effect of High Pressure on the selection of materials has been considered in these 
studies. Sufficient studies of fatigue crack growth data for Cr-Mo pressure vessel steels to 
enable qualification have been carried out FCH-JU project MATRYCE results on full-scale 
fatigue testing of type 1 (metallic) pressure vessels with defects demonstrates 
susceptibility for crack propagation under hydrogen of low-stress pressure vessel 
designs. MATHRYCE has defined a methodology for metallic cylinders design/lifetime 
assessment based on lab-scale tests and taking into account hydrogen enhanced fatigue, 
which have been presented to ISO/TC 197, WG 15 and an annex has been provided for 
the current draft ISO/CD 19884 standard based on the use of a hydrogen sensitivity 
factor to be applied to the life of a component tested under hydraulic loading [61]. 
The effect of gas impurities has been considered in the studies on material compatibility. 
Effect of CO, O2 and H2O on H2 embrittlement has been determined [62]. 
8.4.2 Polymers. 
Improved liners using polyamide PA 6 resin have been reported (Toyota) to deliver better 
performance for hydrogen permeation (an order of magnitude superior to high density 
polyethylene, HDPE) and excellent mechanical performance, in terms of durability in 
withstanding sudden changes in tank temperature from filling and discharging hydrogen, 
and shock resistance in extreme cold environment. PA 6 has good mechanical properties 
(ductility, long term heat resistance, impact resistance at low temperature, creep 
resistance…) for H2 tank liner and low costs. On the other hand PA 11 is used in pipeline 
liners. 
The influence of operating conditions (depressurization rate) on liner buckling and 
strategies to avoid it as the liner configuration designs as part of tanks and 
installation/operation guidelines have been recently studied in several research projects 
[63, 64].  
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8.5 Research topics on-going and planned at near term 
8.5.1 Metals 
International partnership to evaluate high hardenability Ni-Cr-Mo pressure vessel steels: 
- Fatigue crack growth and fracture (ASME KD-10 design method), 
- Industry partners from US, Europe and Japan. 
Fundamental understanding of surface effects and impurities on hydrogen embrittlement: 
- Fundamental work in US and Japan. 
Fatigue-life testing and methodology development: 
- US, Japan and Germany (national labs and academic institutions), 
- Coordination through SAE committees. 
H2 compatibility of high-strength pipeline materials and welds: 
- Taking into account the role of residual stresses in welded materials and 
considering influence on the selected test method. 
8.5.2 Polymers 
Evaluation of polymeric materials physical properties and mechanical performance 
changes under High Pressure hydrogen exposure (static) at long term exposure to large 
pressure gradient experiments (35-100-35 MPa) with and without temperature cycling (-
45 to 85ºC) is being studied in the US DoE project Compatibility of Polymeric Materials 
used in the Hydrogen Infrastructure" [65]. 
Studies on permeability, diffusivity and solubility of H2 in liners materials to understand 
the conditions for blister formation in type IV tanks are actually being carried out in 
several projects [66].  
Characterization tests for polymers used for gaskets, seals & O-rings (H2 permeability, 
diffusivity and solubility) and exposure tests to high pressure hydrogen are on-going. In 
2017 evaluation of combined effects of pressure and extreme temperature (-40 °C and 
100 °C ) is foreseen. 
Physical & Chemical analysis of hydrogen refuelling station (HRS) hoses before and after 
accelerated life testing (cycling under mechanical, pressure, temperature and time 
stress) are being studied by NREL in a US DoE [67]. First results indicate that after a 
number of chilled cycles (1856) leaks develop at both hose ends (dispenser and nozzle). 
A cryogenically flexible, low-permeability, hydrogen delivery hose is studied in DoE 
Project PD101 at Nanosonic [68]. The aim is to develop a flexible hose  for H70 (Hose for 
700 bar pressure) service reliable at -50 °C and 875 bar; with optimised ruggedness, 
cost and safety, standing 70 fills/day and more than 2 year service life. The prototype is 
tested and qualification test with OEM dispenser/nozzle for safety and environmental 
durability are ongoing. Deployment is expected in 2017. 
Neutron scattering & X-ray scattering to investigate molecular dynamics of H2 solvated 
polymers and to identify microscopic properties critical to polymer 
performance/prediction of failure mode studies are being carried out at ORNL. 
Initial observations and studies of damage accumulation in elastomers have been 
performed. Despite these efforts, results are not generalized, standardized methods are 
still missing and selection criteria are not systematically developed. 
8.6 Gaps and Next Steps 
Taking into account the information provided and the discussions held at the workshop 
the following comments and research lines were stated. 
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8.6.1 Metals  
A future project should validate the testing methodology used in different laboratories to 
characterize hydrogen compatibility in view of international standardization.  
 More projects facilitating the increase of understanding on Fatigue Crack Initiation 
and Propagation of small cracks under hydrogen pressure would be valuable.  
o Testing to evaluate fatigue crack initiation under low stress intensity factor 
K requires long time and modelling will help to define key tests for model 
validation. Studying of the effect of hydrogen pressure on the K threshold 
is also important. 
o Finally, a data base providing fatigue data for the most probable materials 
to be used for hydrogen pressure vessels would be very useful. Efficient 
accelerated test methodologies are desirable. 
 Work to update design rules and test protocols should be continued, especially for 
the fatigue crack initiation stage (short cracks), both in terms of mechanism and 
early propagation rate (due to fast propagation step in hydrogen afterwards). 
 Continue to study scalability of fatigue testing, taking into account the effect of 
deep (low R=Pmin/Pmax ratio) versus shallow (high R ratio) cycles, and H2 
accelerating effect for laboratory (specimen) and full scale test (pressure vessel). 
Shallow cycles require longer testing times and a correlation between shallow and 
deep cycles requires validation and acceptance. 
 International consensus on metrics for qualification of metals for specific 
applications is required:  
o Onboard vehicles, Fueling stations (storage, compression, components, 
etc). Acceptance criteria of low-cost materials that are “embrittled” but 
adequate for the operation range should be considered. 
 Role of impurities and inhibitors has to be assessed: 
o This is an important issue that has been recently studied and needs further 
research.  Can impurities “protect” a system under all operating 
conditions? This information is especially needed for hydrogen/natural gas 
mixtures. 
 The industrial technology for liquid hydrogen storage and distribution is well 
developed (for large capital projects), but may not be adequate for large-volume 
commercial sector (stations). 
The use of existing natural gas pipeline networks for gaseous hydrogen delivery and 
transmission should be evaluated for blends and pure hydrogen. The materials used for 
pure H2 delivered to customer (residential and industrial) should be evaluated. 
8.6.2 Polymers 
Blistering/swelling behaviour has been shown to be caused by hydrogen sorption and 
formed during decompression. Some further studies are needed to confirm these 
findings. 
Study mechanical performance of polymers under hydrogen: HDPE elasticity modulus 
yield strength is considerably lower under high hydrogen pressure, while ductility 
increases. The evolution is not permanent; the material recovers the original 
characteristics after the end of exposure. Harmonized methods for measuring properties 
of polymers at high pressure in H2 environment and metrics to quantify the effect of H2 
are required. 
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Influence of High temperatures in tanks, the question is if polymer liners can resist 
higher temperatures than 85 °C while still performing at temperatures down to -40 °C (in 
terms of liner mechanical properties and permeability). 
Study the effect of temperature excursions(does exceeding the range -40 to 85 °C a 
number of times during tank lifetime affect performance at end of life?) and assess tanks 
resistance to operational and accidental thermal shocks (e.g. hot tank fill with very cold 
H2 or very fast emptied; cold tank filled in a very short time/with non-precooled H2). 
Characterization of thermal Fatigue and Hydrogen effect: Evaluation of long term 
exposure and degradation at end-of-life is needed  
Understanding of failure modes and development of efficient accelerated test 
methodologies are also required There is the need for ageing models for materials and 
structure considering mechanical and environmental loads (including liner collapse) to 
define lifetime of the components and optimize design and testing protocols. Methods for 
degradation and ageing assessment and end-of-life criteria are still needed. 
Fit for purpose tests (both on samples and components) need to be developed: this 
requires knowledge of operating and accidental conditions and the feedback from e.g. 
OEMs, hydrogen fuelling infrastructure operators, etc.. 
Non-destructive methods for liners evaluation (blisters / cracks / buckling) and criteria 
for "healthy" tank and pipeline need to be developed and qualified for in-service 
inspection. 
Further assessment on the interaction of tanks materials and robust sealing concepts 
might be required. 
Variability of material properties depending on the supplier (for a given polymer) is still 
an open issue.  
Other open topics are:  
 embrittlement of elastomers at low temperature  
 Hydrogen compatibility for materials in appliances operating at low pressure, but 
subjected to temperature excursions (home fuelling). 
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9 General Aspects of Safety 
Chair: Frank Markert (DTU) - Participants and contributors: William Buttner (NREL), 
Eveline Weidner (EC-JRC), Franck Verbecke (AREVA) and Nick Barilo (PNNL) 
9.1 Introduction 
The topic comprises hydrogen safety training, mitigation including sensor and human 
behaviour. The latter is a new topic taken into account, while the first two topics were 
separately analyzed in the prior Research Priorities Workshop 2014 under the headlines: 
“Hydrogen Safety training” ranked 8th in 2014 and “Materials Compatibility/Sensors” 
ranked 9th in 2014. 
9.2 Status at the time of previous workshop 
The sub-topics for “Hydrogen Safety Training” achieved the following priorities on RPW 
2014. “Higher education in hydrogen safety engineering” and “Establish an international 
forum to facilitate discussion on FR training […]” received the highest and second highest 
votes, respectively. Closely followed by topics of hydrogen safety in enclosures (topic 8.9 
and first responder training in topic 8.7), as seen in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1: Expert voting on “Hydrogen Safety Training” of the RPW 2014  
 
The results of the second topic “Materials / Compatibility / Sensors” are shown in Table 
9.2. Further work on sensors were recognized as a significant research topic to improve 
safety, since the highest and second highest scores achieved topic “Reliability testing and 
validation of sensors for specific applications” and “Sensor placement to maximize 
effectiveness in specific applications”, respectively. While the topic 9.7 “Hydrogen- metals 
interaction studies […]” and the topic 9.5 “Comply Educational and online interactive 
training […]” are ranked 3rd and 4th place. 
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Table 9.2: Expert voting on “Materials Compatibility / Sensors” of the RPW 2014  
 
9.3 Progress /Closed gaps 
Progress is documented by the given references [69-77] 
9.3.1 Progress “Hydrogen Safety Training” 
This topic was presented by Franck Verbecke (AREVA, France). 
The prioritized topics as described for topic 8 “Hydrogen Safety training” are followed up 
on several points. University Ulster provided an educational and online interactive 
training and the International Curriculum on hydrogen safety training for First 
Responders (FRs) has been established. 
Additionally, education materials have been developed for First Responders for on-site 
and web based training: 
● State-of-the-art in hydrogen safety science and engineering and develop science-
informed training materials dedicated to FRs  
● RCS-informed training materials 
● Intervention strategy and tactics for assessing accident scene status and decision 
making 
● Web-based course and exercises 
The operational training platform (EHSTP) build and driven by AREVA, France, is shown 
in Figure 9.1. It consists of an area of 2500 m2 and enables to simulate 109 different 
scenarios and enabling fuel comparison using hydrogen, CNG and LPG at different 
pressures. 
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Figure 9.1: European Hydrogen Safety Training Platform (EHSTP). 2500 m2; fuel comparison using 
hydrogen (700, 350 and 200 bar), CNG (200 bar) and LPG (20 bar) 
Furthermore, a Virtual Reality training platform (CRISE) has been established to provide 
virtual training scenarios for real world situations for realistic potential accident scenarios 
involving hydrogen, as e.g. in tunnel accidents as shown in Figure 9.2. 
 
Figure 10.2: CRISE scenario 
This enabled three face-to-face training session involving 71 trainees from 15 countries 
(Germany, Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Spain, USA, France, Italy, Norway, The 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, UK, Sweden, Czech Republic). Additionally, these sessions 
had 21 observers from 10 countries (Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, USA, Japan and Taiwan). The instructions were provided by 15 
instructors / lecturers being IA-HySafe partners and experts in the respective fields. 
The above-described activities are supplemented with an “Emergency Response Guide” 
shown in Table 9.3 below. All the activities resulted in an international collaboration with 
various stakeholders as listed below: 
● International Association of Fire and Rescue Services (CTIF) 
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● Commission “Extrication and New Technologie” 
● European Fire Services  
● Automotive car manufacturer  
● Toyota 
● US DOE and PNNL 
● HySUT (Japan) 
● Taiwan 
Table 9.3: Emergency Response Guide 
 
9.3.2 Progress “Materials Compatibility/Sensors” 
William Buttner (NREL) presented this topic in cooperation with Eveline Weidner (EU-JRC 
(Petten)). 
Hydrogen sensors are a critical element for the safe implementation of hydrogen as an 
alternative fuel.  As an independent safety element that is not an operational part of the 
hydrogen system, sensors provide an indication of a hydrogen leak at an early stage 
before it becomes dangerous, such as through audible alarms, flashing indicator lights, or 
electronic signals to a central control center.  In addition to warnings, sensors can 
activate corrective and protective measures, including activation of the ventilation 
system or shutting off the hydrogen fuel supply. There are numerous reports of a sensor 
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alarm successfully preventing a potentially serious event.  Thus, it is important to use 
sensors to protect relevant infrastructures and vehicles. Within the United States, the use 
of sensors is mandated for several specific hydrogen applications by national codes as 
NFPA 2 and IFC.  Although not explicitly required within Europe, sensors are one means 
to achieve a required SIL (Safety Integrity Level).  A number of common commercial H2 
sensor platforms have been developed as listed in   
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Table . Each sensor platform has its advantages as well as limitations.  Since no 
individual platform will be good for all applications, end-users must evaluate sensor 
options for their specific requirements.  However, this is challenging because commercial 
models may have comparable manufacturer specifications, but exhibit significantly 
different behaviour when deployed.  This is illustrated in Figure 9.3  which compares 
different sensor models in both clean and industrial environments.  In addition to sensor 
selection, it is also critical that sensors be properly used, including placement.  There is 
however, no validated guidance document on sensor placement. It needs to be stressed 
that any sensor only will work if it is used properly.  
 
Fig. 9.3: Test for sensor responses (final indications) to various hydrogen levels prior to and 
following deployment [78].  
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Table 9.4: Commercial hydrogen sensors  
 
9.3.3 Progress concerning Human behaviour 
Frank Markert presented this topic, who leads activities within this topic within IEA HIA 
Task 37.  
The topic was not subject of the former PRW 2014. The human behaviour as part of the 
evaluation of general safety aspects concerning hydrogen safety is limited. There are 
some studies such as a study on human error assessment of hydrogen fueling 
technologies and studies on the perception of hydrogen technologies. Nevertheless, the 
topic is generic. Therefore, application of studies and methodologies form other scientific 
/ technical fields are possible. There was and still there is work done in connection with 
the nuclear field; a number of error estimate models that were first applied in other fields 
are still being developed and most likely will be applicable also in the field of hydrogen 
safety. Strong activities are found in the transport safety research area as aviation and 
maritime industries. Human behaviour research is also found in the field of process 
industries, which provide a direct link to hydrogen processing and industrial installations. 
The EU ARAMIS project developed a QRA methodology including human and 
organizational aspects. In Norway the BORA methodology was developed to improve 
offshore maintenance including human error (e.g. during maintenance). 
Human behaviour is an important factor in various hydrogen activities; it is seen as an 
organizational factor that organize activities from leading level to the operational level. 
Humans in the end contribute strongly in maintaining safety as they are controlling 
processes e.g. during the design phase for new applications and during the operational 
phase for established ones. Generic estimates on the probability that human error is the 
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primary causal factor in industrial and transport accidents is reported between 50 and 
90%. Castiglia [71] found human behaviour in hydrogen incidents is due to one or more 
of the following factors: 
● Lack of personnel training on specific equipment, systems and operating scenarios 
● Inadequately training of personal regarding the properties of hydrogen and the 
potential consequences of their actions 
● Daydreaming and complacent actions by personnel operating hydrogen and 
related equipment 
● Personnel not following written procedures, because of personal reasons or bad 
procedures 
Of special importance are safety barriers established to prevent or mitigate accidents. 
Safety barriers are only active when something goes wrong. Malfunctions may not be 
recognized or repaired as timely as processing malfunctions that usually are recognized 
immediately. Safety barriers including the action of humans are therefore included here 
under the "human behaviour" label. The type of dependency on human behaviour varies 
for different safety barrier types as shown in Figure . It is a weaker dependence for 
passive barriers, but very strong for preventive barriers as “respect for safety zones”. 
 
Figure 9.4: Safety Barrier types including barriers influenced by human behaviour 
9.4 Gaps and Next Steps  
9.4.1 Hydrogen Safety Training 
In order to develop this topic a portfolio of hydrogen safety trainings is suggested to be 
developed. They should focus on: 
● Different population e.g. operators vs firefighters  
● Different levels e.g. basic firefighters vs. high-rank officers 
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● Different type of application i.e. stationary vs. transport applications 
● Different training duration e.g. 2 days vs. 1 week 
● Estimating a cost/trainee for each training 
● Promoting training through networking channels 
It is seen as an important priority to establish training/teaching courses for first 
responder trainers and Hazmat officers. That is, persons that will be responsible for the 
establishment of national hydrogen safety training programs using their national 
language and regulations. This type of education will benefit from the already established 
educational program described above using the operational and virtual reality platforms 
developed in the frame of the HyResponse project. 
Another priority, is “opening” the HyResponse training platform to the hydrogen 
community. It will support a demystification of hydrogen risks due to real experiences 
concerning hydrogen safety issues. This is addressing e.g. operators, site managers, 
Firefighter, persons involved in the permitting process. The training platform could be 
opened and used for R&D collaborations, e.g. research to improving operational methods. 
9.4.2  Mitigation including sensors 
Hydrogen Sensors are currently and successfully being deployed to assure safety. 
Nevertheless, the sensor technology still provides some critical gaps, as identified by 
feedback within the community (e.g. the H2Sense project). In the following these critical 
gaps are briefly listed and categorized as part of the performance metrics. It is evaluated 
that the impact of exiting gaps in sensor technology probably can be exacerbated in 
more specialized fields such as within power-to-gas field and the C&S support in pre-
normative research.  
The critical gaps found can be categorized in the following domains. 
1) Analytical Metrics  
a. Long term stability of sensors 
Field performance due to long-term impact of temperature, pressure, 
hydrocarbons and other chemicals 
b. Lack of predictors 
Insufficient knowledge on mode of sensor failure, ALT and end-of-life 
indications  
c. Selectivity 
d. Perceived performance 
2) Operational Metrics 
a. Calibration and maintenance 
3) Deployment Metrics 
a. Sensor selection and use 
Sensor test protocols; Guidance on deployment/ placement of (array of) 
sensors; Networking vs. WAM; Certification costs and harmonization; 
Market sustainability 
There is on-going research within the gap 3a) to develop a guidance document for sensor 
placement with integrated empirical and theoretical modelling of hydrogen releases 
performed by NREL, JRC and AVT. The first step in the project is to assess small indoor 
facilities to develop guidance in the framework of NFPA 2. It is recommended for the 
future to enlarge the guidance to cover large area facilities and to allow for minimization 
of the number of sensors used without compromising safety. 
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9.4.3 Human behaviour 
Generic research has been and still is conducted on human behaviour. Actually, it is the 
main focus in the fields of road, train and maritime transportation. Many of the 
approaches may be applicable also for the hydrogen safety area, but some more 
verifications are needed. The application of safety barrier categories and the influence on 
their functionality due to human behaviour, should be re-assessed for hydrogen 
applications and technologies. Improved methods that better predict safety barriers 
probability of failure taking into account human errors, need to be developed. 
Many countries allow for a performance based evaluation in the permission process for 
new buildings and installations. Another direction is seen in the development of Monte 
Carlo simulation based probabilistic models that can handle dynamic systems in a more 
appropriate manner. Such approaches can help to better identify worst case damages 
and their likelihood. Furthermore, human behaviour in evacuation situations could be 
better assessed with better predictions of the available and required time to escape. This 
is essential for risk assessment and permitting of hydrogen applications in larger 
infrastructures such as tunnels and car parks.  
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10 Priorities 
The concluding summaries of the session chairs presented above have been combined 
with the results of the survey, given in detail in the Annex, to derive the following 
priorities. 
The first set of priorities deals with the accident physics and material issues which are 
the indispensable basis for improved risk assessment and management methodologies 
and for safer applications in general. Therefore, these fundamental issues are reflected in 
the subsequent prioritisation chapters. 
10.1 General Physics and Material Issues 
With respect to general accident physics involving hydrogen in its gaseous phase, 
premixed combustion is given highest priority for further investigation. The phenomena is 
well understood from a fundamental perspective but modeling of flame acceleration and 
DDT and associated pressure effects for large scale applications with obstacles and 
interaction with mitigation techniques, in particular venting  and water sprays, needs 
further work (1st and 2nd rank in 1) Accident Physics – Gas).  
In contrast the fundamental science basis for non-premixed flames is very good. The 
hazards from these flames are well characterized. Reduced order models have been 
developed and work reasonably well to predict thermal load consequences and are being 
used in integrated platforms (HyRAM). Therefore the sub-topic of non-premixed jet 
flames is given a low priority for further investigation. Only exception from this general 
statement is the radiation properties of large scale fire balls and jet fires. Validation data 
is lacking for these phenomena. 
Regarding the liquid hydrogen behaviour a number of knowledge gaps still exist and 
validated models are lacking for all accident phenomena. Validated models for multiphase 
releases (chocked flow/jets) and accumulations in particular in congested areas indoors 
and outdoors have highest priority (1st ,2nd and 3rd rank in 2) Accident Physics – Liquid, 
supported by 4th rank topics all with similar >10% votes). Second priority is attributed to 
pool spreading and fires as well as BLEVE and fire resistance of cryo-containers. Although 
some efforts and little progress in the dispersion modelling could be made with few large 
scale experiments performed by HSL, these experiments also generated new open points 
in particular regarding the multiphase characteristics of the pool and spontaneous 
ignition. 
In general for both, hydrogen in its gaseous and liquid phase, realistic boundary 
conditions (congestion and confinement) as well as the ignition physics are highlighted 
directly or at least indirectly. 
Setting up and filling a database of fatigue data (fatigue crack initiation and propagation) 
for the most relevant pressure vessel materials has been given highest priority in the 
material session (1st and 2nd rank in 5.2) Performance Assessment of Material). Highly 
correlated is the need for better understanding the influence of pressure, purity and 
temperature on these data and to agree on suitable qualification metrics and test 
strategies. (1st rank in 5.1) Testing of materials). 
For polymers appropriate models for lifetime prediction under realistic conditions 
(pressure swing, temperature excursions, etc), standard test protocols and selection 
criteria have been prioritized on a similar high level (2nd rank (out of 5) in 5.1) and 3rd 
rank (out of 8) in 5.2)). 
10.2 Risk Assessment 
With respect to Risk Assessment considerable progress could be achieved with the QRA 
Tool HyRAM. As the QRA Tools topic had been prioritized strongly in the previous 
workshop (Washington 2014) several related activities have been initiated or enforced 
worldwide. However, highest maturity is achieved with the US DoE supported HyRAM 
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tool. However, for all of these tools frequency data, highest priority (1st rank in 3) 
Integration Computational Tools), and suitable models for accounting for mitigation 
measures, 2nd priority (2nd  rank in 3) Integration Computational Tools) are lacking. The 
lack of consequence modeling tools obviously refers to the open issues in the general 
physics session listed above. In general validation concepts have to be developed for 
these tools (3rd rank in 3) Integration Computational Tools). Possibly some results of the 
FCH-JU Project SUSANA for the validation of CFD codes for risk assessment could be 
transferred. 
10.3 Applications 
The different applications add special technical aspects to the general physics prioritized 
above. Intentionally, at the workshop and in the priority survey no application has been 
prioritized against another. However, within an application topic the issues have been 
prioritized as follows. 
For public supply infrastructure, i.e. hydrogen fueling stations the expected scaling up 
and efficiency requirements of the fueling services implies increasing usage of LH2. 
Therefore most relevant scenarios include LH2 related phenomena (like safe transfer of 
LH2 from trucks to the stations), but also general fire, pressure vessel ruptures and 
explosions of premixed systems including direct and missile effects at the HFS. First 
priority is to account for cascading effects, presence or accident initiation with 
conventional fuels (multi fuel stations) and the complex and partially confined real 
scenarios (large bus fleets, trains, etc.) in the applied risk assessment (1st rank in 7.1) 
Application HFS). Appropriate models for mitigation concepts should eliminate 
unnecessary over-conservatisms and avoid raising unjustified safety concerns in the 
public (2nd rank in 7.1) Application HFS). Obviously, the HFS topic also links to the 
material issues. In particular the welding processes for steels suitable for high pressure, 
high purity application deserves further attention (3rd rank in 7.1) Application HFS).  
For the hydrogen vehicles in particular accidental scenarios in confined or partially 
confined environment, like tunnel, garages, repair shops or at fueling stations, have been 
given highest priority (1st and 3rd rank in 7.2) Application FCV) These scenarios include 
the critical issue of safe strategies for first and second responders and concepts for 
mitigating catastrophic pressure vessel ruptures. 
With the onboard storage representing the most critical component of a hydrogen vehicle 
this topic is highly correlated with general safety topics of hydrogen storage. There 
improved protection against fire or thermal excursions has highest priority (2nd rank in 
7.2) Application FCV and 1st rank in 6) Storage). This priority is supported by the 
required upgrade of the GTR n°13 where definition of more realistic car fires (heat flux 
measurements and testing) is required to standardize the corresponding testing 
appropriately. Structural health monitoring has 2nd priority in the Storage topic and - also 
closely related to the Materials issues - modeling of ageing and thermal degradation with 
a special focus on liner stability and permeability has 3rd priority (see corresponding 
ranks in 6) Storage). 
Most of the open issues of the Power-to-Hydrogen PtH application are material related. 
Compared to the other applications, this application has matured considerably. Safety 
relevant parameters of hydrogen/natural gas blends have been evaluated or are just on 
the way to be published. However, support for international harmonized standardization 
is required for transnational solutions and for demonstration of a harmonized common 
knowledge. To this end collection of field data is considered the most important action 
(1st rank in 7.3) Application PtH). Introduction of significant volumes of natural 
gas/hydrogen mixtures can have a significant impact on the currently used infrastructure 
and connected applications. Respondents also prioritized (2nd and 3rd position) potential 
concerns in terms of performance of current applications and safety (e.g.: flame 
stability). 
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Hydrogen aerospace and aviation applications are mainly applying LH2 for gravitational 
performance reasons. Therefore these applications refer to the same gaps in the basic 
understanding and in the modeling capabilities as introduced above for the general LH2 
related accident physics. 
10.4 General Aspects of Safety 
This chapter addresses general risk management and mitigation concepts including 
sensors. 
Hydrogen sensors are currently and successfully being deployed to assure safety. 
Nevertheless, the sensor technology still provides some critical gaps, as identified by 
feedback within e.g. the H2Sense project. Among quite a few open issues highest priority 
is attributed to providing appropriate guidance on selection and placement of sensors in 
the different applications (1st rank in 4) General Aspects of Safety). 
Risk management includes human behaviour, education and training. For first responders 
training there have been serious efforts and progress worldwide (HAMMER facility and 
HyResponse project, for instance). However, in relation to the hydrogen vehicle priorities 
additional efforts are needed for first responders training in special environments (2nd 
rank in 4)  - see also General Aspects of Safety in particular addressing tunnel and large 
garage scenarios. Strategies for second responders have to be developed too, when 
considering recent catastrophic events with natural gas vehicles.  
In general human behaviour is key for safety also in hydrogen application. Therefore this 
factor has to be included in all efforts for improving the safety culture and overall safety 
performance. 
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11 Summary 
This report on the Research Priorities Workshop 2016 summarized the discussion during 
the workshop and the ranking of research priorities subsequent to the workshop.  It 
identifies the state-of-the-art in topical areas relevant to hydrogen safety to accelerate 
the deployment of hydrogen technologies. The topics were carefully chosen from 
previous workshops and to cover emerging gaps as the deployment of hydrogen 
technologies evolve. The workshop identified current research focus areas, those areas 
where current research topics need to mature, and those areas where the technical 
community felt there were serious gaps in our efforts to ensure safe deployment.  See 
the Annex Survey results for a discussion of the survey and tabulated results. 
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Annex - Priority Survey 
Introduction 
The Research Priority Workshop on Hydrogen Safety organized in Petten in September 
2016 was followed by a survey addressed to experts in the field of the hydrogen safety. 
The experts were identified by the workshop organizers and were asked to prioritize 
among selected topics. This exercise has the aim to set a rank of priorities from the 
current gaps in hydrogen safety topics. It creates a tool which can be used by interested 
parties and it can be used to assess consensus on priorities as expressed by a wide 
international community of specialists in the field.  
Survey Methodology 
The categories were chosen by the workshop organizers and were based on the topics 
which emerged during the workshop.  
Each respondent had to prioritize the first five topics he/she deemed most relevant in 
each category. A score from one to five was assigned according to ranking. The first 
preference was assigned a score of five, the second one a score of four, the third one a 
score of three the fourth one a score of two and a score of one was assigned to the fifth 
preference. 
The final ranking for each category was obtained by adding up the singles scores.  
Contrary to the previous exercise, it was decided to avoid an overarching ranking among 
the various session. The reason for this is a) that it would have been a rather in-
homogeneous comparison, i.e. applications versus physical phenomena, b) some of the 
topic appears in more than one session. 
1.3 Results 
As a general remark, in each session some topics seem to stand out with respect to the 
others. Usually one topic receives a higher score, while two other topics are close behind 
and with a shorter distance among them.  
In the following, the results are presented already divided into the different sessions. The 
score and the percentage of points attributed to each topic within a session are 
summarized in a table for each session. 
 1 Accident Physics – Gas 
1.0.1 Venting cannot be accurately predicted when coupled with premixed combustion 
overpressure 
1.0.2 Statistical approaches to ignition need further refinement to improve reduced order 
predictions 
1.0.3 Spontaneous ignition is not at all understood 
1.0.4 Premixed combustion - further modelling studies are needed for large scale applied 
problems with obstacles, – particularly for DDT, Flame acceleration in confined and 
obstructed spaces and Blast Waves 
1.0.5 Jet flames 
  
Accident Physics - Gas tot %
1.0.1 86 22.93
1.0.2 70 18.67
1.0.3 67 17.87
1.0.4 90 24.00
1.0.5 62 16.53
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 2 Accident Physics – Liquid 
2.0.1 Knowledge and experience related to indoor releases and dispersion 
2.0.2 Knowledge and experience related releases involving large quantities 
2.0.3 Knowledge and experience related releases in congested areas 
2.0.4 Multi-phase accumulations with explosion potential (LH2 can condense and freeze oxygen. 
The resultant mixture can be made to detonate): conditions for occurrence and their 
consequences are not understood 
2.0.5 BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion or Fireball): knowledge on fire 
resistance and prediction of consequences are needed. 
2.0.6 Studies on humidity / air phase change during LH2 and cryogenic compressed hydrogen 
releases should be undertaken in order to inform modelling of these phenomena 
2.0.7 Correlations for accurately calculating the specific heat capacity of hydrogen at low 
temperatures and high pressures should be further investigated and incorporated into CFD 
codes. 
2.0.8 CFD validation especially for complex obstructed industrial environments and various 
weather conditions (wind speed atmospheric stability class) 
2.0.9 Modelling of the two phase chocked releases, in particular for achieving a reasonable 
estimation of the mass flow rate 
2.0.10 Further development of pool spreading and evapouration models, coupled with vapour 
dispersion. Research should be directed at improving the modelling of ground heat flux in 
cases where a liquid pool is formed- for both solid and liquid (usually water) 
substrates.  The radiative heat transfer and its contribution to the total heat transfer from 
the air and ground to the cold cloud should also be studied. Liquid hydrogen pool fire not 
well characterised 
2.0.11 Evaluation and comparison of the performance of the different Equation of States (EOS) in 
the two phase chocked flow approaches should be attempted 
 
  
Accident Physics - Liquid tot %
2.0.1 28 7.47
2.0.2 38 10.13
2.0.3 47 12.53
2.0.4 62 16.53
2.0.5 40 10.67
2.0.6 23 6.13
2.0.7 10 2.67
2.0.8 44 11.73
2.0.9 38 10.13
2.0.10 39 10.40
2.0.11 6 1.60
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 3 Integration Computational Tools 
3.0.1 Develop suitable models for accounting for the effects of different mitigation measures 
appropriately 
3.0.2 Data/probabilities for hydrogen system component failures (e.g.: leak frequencies, detection 
effectiveness, etc.) from operative experiences 
3.0.3 Features and models to enable deeper system-specific insights to enable overcoming station-
siting barriers: i) uncertainty & sensitivity analysis capabilities and ii) higher fidelity and depth 
of QRA. 
3.0.4 Develop validation, testing, training and design decision making strategies of such QRA tools 
3.0.5 Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) for the CFD in the consequence analysis tools 
3.0.6 Models based on fault & event trees, Bayesian networks, cause-consequence and barrier 
diagrams are still not able to handle dynamic events 
3.0.7 Models for accurate prediction of pressure-peaking phenomena for ignited releases 
3.0.8 Models for accurate prediction of radiation from hydrogen fireball after high-pressure CGH2 
tank rapture in a fire 
3.0.9 Models for accurate prediction of buoyancy effects on jet fire hazard distances 
 
  
Integration Computational Tools tot %
3.0.1 65 17.33
3.0.2 92 24.53
3.0.3 27 7.20
3.0.4 49 13.07
3.0.5 30 8.00
3.0.6 26 6.93
3.0.7 30 8.00
3.0.8 35 9.33
3.0.9 21 5.60
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 4 General Aspect of Safety 
4.0.1 Training of First Responders’ trainers and Hazmat Officers 
4.0.2 Guidance on sensor placement 
4.0.3 Long-term stability and accelerated stability testing for sensors 
4.0.4 Selectivity testing for sensors to be used with complex gas mixtures 
4.0.5 Development of Monte Carlo methods using simplified models for RA of dynamic systems 
4.0.6 Addressing safety barrier types and their PFD (Probability of Failure on Demand) changes by 
human behaviour 
 
  
General Aspect of Safety tot %
4.0.1 78 20.80
4.0.2 93 24.80
4.0.3 53 14.13
4.0.4 53 14.13
4.0.5 29 7.73
4.0.6 69 18.40
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 5 Material – 1: Testing aspects related to the characterization of materials 
5.1.1 Methodology validation on several metals and components between different 
laboratories.  (priority also relevant for future international standardization efforts) 
5.1.2 International consensus on metrics for qualification of metals for specific applications 
5.1.3 Definition of test protocols, Selection criteria and relevant standards for polymer materials 
5.1.4 Development of non-destructive test methods for liner evaluation 
5.1.5 Activities on seals, gaskets, hoses, valves and joints. They should receive similar attention to 
the tank material and their behaviour tested under different and realistic conditions 
  Material – 2: Performance assessment of materials 
5.2.1 Better understanding on Fatigue Crack Initiation and Propagation. In particular focusing on 
small cracks and better understanding of the effect of hydrogen pressure on the threshold of 
the stress intensity factor range. Special attention to low-temperature / high-pressure 
conditions. From a general point of view a better understanding of materials behaviour under 
mechanical stresses is needed 
5.2.2 Database providing fatigue data for the most probable materials to be used for hydrogen 
pressure vessels 
5.2.3 Scalability of fatigue testing: effect of deep vs shallow cycles, hydrogen accelerating effect for 
lab (specimen) versus full scale testing (pressure vessel) 
5.2.4 Evaluation and assessment of integrity of existing pipeline networks for pure hydrogen 
5.2.5 Mechanical performance of polymers under hydrogen has to be better characterised (including 
blistering, swelling). Also studies on the reversibility of these materials 
5.2.6 Better understanding of the role of impurities and inhibitors 
5.2.7 Assessment of materials for specific liquid hydrogen applications 
5.2.8 Definition of appropriate models for lifetime predictions for polymers. In particular, correlation 
between the behaviour of polymers under low hydrogen pressures and high hydrogen 
pressures and effects of temperature peaks (or valleys) and temperature excursions in tanks 
containing polymers. Correlations between permeation and pressure/temperature conditions, 
especially with the aim of achieving prediction capabilities 
 
  
Material - 1 tot %
5.1.1 73 19.47
5.1.2 85 22.67
5.1.3 76 20.27
5.1.4 66 17.60
5.1.5 75 20.00
Material - 2 tot %
5.2.1 55 15.28
5.2.2 72 20.00
5.2.3 37 10.28
5.2.4 43 11.94
5.2.5 44 12.22
5.2.6 15 4.17
5.2.7 44 12.22
5.2.8 50 13.89
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 6 Storage 
6.0.1 Ageing models considering mechanical loads and all influencing operating parameters, 
including liner collapse (this will also assist improvement of  test protocols defining material 
selection criteria to qualify H2 cylinder design) 
6.0.2 Modelling the damage induced by impacts on high-pressure tanks 
6.0.3 Fires: new solutions for smart and reliable fire detection and protection systems (TPRD, 
protections, fire detections, heat conduction to promote liner melting, etc.) 
6.0.4 Understanding effect of overheating on the structural performance and lifetime of the whole 
storage systems in case of extreme hot filling scenarios, and other temperature excursions. 
6.0.5 Structural health monitoring of pressure vessels for operative conditions (fatigue, creep, 
etc.)  and accidental conditions (after crash, thermal events and misuse). 
6.0.6 Non-destructive-techniques for ensuring constant manufacturing quality and required 
performance (number of cycles, tightness, etc). 
6.0.7 Testing of and advanced testing methodology for TPRD, to identify failure modes and 
frequencies. 
6.0.8 Hydrogen conversion system (for blow off hydrogen), improve availability and operating range 
in cryo-compressed storage systems 
6.0.9 Burst impact mitigation 
6.0.10 Extreme impact loads: event statistics, protection on vehicle side, pressure vessel robustness 
6.0.11 Improvement of insulation function in cryo-compressed storage systems 
 
  
Storage tot %
6.0.1 51 13.08
6.0.2 28 7.18
6.0.3 76 19.49
6.0.4 48 12.31
6.0.5 53 13.59
6.0.6 30 7.69
6.0.7 34 8.72
6.0.8 11 2.82
6.0.9 27 6.92
6.0.10 26 6.67
6.0.11 6 1.54
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 7 Application – 1: Hydrogen Fueling Station 
7.1.1 Adverse effects on material and systems in 'below-design', idling conditions (corrosion, T 
cycles, etc.) 
7.1.2 Reduction of the over conservative expensive design raising safety and efficiency concerns 
(e.g. alarm limits, electrical grounding of busses and cooling requirements) 
7.1.3 Material and processing (welding) issues for high pressure components 
7.1.4 Compressor: ventilation requirements for compressor containers 
7.1.5 Compressor: effect of compressor vibrations on material 
7.1.6 Cascade effects: effect of various accidental releases in case of scale-up, complex real 
geometry (large bus fleets, trains, etc.) 
  Application – 2: Fuel Cell Vehicles 
7.2.1 State of health/monitoring 
7.2.2 Hydrogen venting via TPRD in garages (especially a single car garage) 
7.2.3 Complex accident situation in tunnels 
7.2.4 Pressure vessel rupture mitigation 
7.2.5 Understanding vehicle fires and the response of storage components to thermal excursion 
7.2.6 Improved protection of vehicles hydrogen systems against fire, thermal excursions and other 
extreme events 
7.2.7 Remotely initiated venting 
  Application – 3: Power to Hydrogen 
7.3.1 List of materials compatible with H2/NG systems, taking into account already collected data 
and available standardization deliverables such as the technical report ISO/TR 15916:2004 7 
7.3.2 Behaviour of H2 in H2/NG on plastics pipes, valves, fittings in house gas installations, storage 
cylinders - effect on components 
7.3.3 Metering and mixture concentration and homogeneity control 
7.3.4 Influence of hydrogen on integrity of underground storages 
7.3.5 Review of testing procedures such as embrittlement and the fatigue life test for H2/NG 
7.3.6 Correlation between laboratory specimen and component tests for the characterization of 
susceptibility to hydrogen embrittlement and enhanced fatigue 
7.3.7 Effect of larger concentration of H2 in H2/NG on flame stability in standard burners 
7.3.8 All kinds of mitigating safety measures (TPRD, Explosion Protection Systems, etc.) have to be 
certified for H2/NG 
7.3.9 Re-assessment of the ATEX Zoning should be standardized for H2/NG 
7.3.10 Collection of available field data from Power-to-H2 installations 
7.3.11 Training on the safety aspects of H2/NG 
  Application – 4: Aerospace / Aviation 
7.4.1 Multi-phase physical processes (heat transfer, mixing with air, and initial thermodynamic status 
of the liquid) are largely unknown for large liquid hydrogen releases 
7.4.2 Determining the probability of detonation with inhomogeneously premixed gaseous clouds 
7.4.3 Behaviour of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen mixtures 
7.4.4 Appropriate design of test cells including suitable mitigation concept 
7.4.5 Physics of hydrogen ignition and flame propagation for low external Pressure and temperature 
(aircraft conditions) 
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Application - 1 tot %
7.1.1 48 12.80
7.1.2 71 18.93
7.1.3 62 16.53
7.1.4 60 16.00
7.1.5 39 10.40
7.1.6 95 25.33
Application - 2 tot %
7.2.1 45 11.54
7.2.2 65 16.67
7.2.3 81 20.77
7.2.4 52 13.33
7.2.5 49 12.56
7.2.6 70 17.95
7.2.7 28 7.18
Application - 3 tot %
7.3.1 26 7.22
7.3.2 29 8.06
7.3.3 35 9.72
7.3.4 39 10.83
7.3.5 16 4.44
7.3.6 13 3.61
7.3.7 44 12.22
7.3.8 42 11.67
7.3.9 21 5.83
7.3.10 52 14.44
7.3.11 43 11.94
Application - 4 tot %
7.4.1 95 25.75
7.4.2 82 22.22
7.4.3 73 19.78
7.4.4 50 13.55
7.4.5 69 18.70
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